Working the Refs
Trading Diversity? Judicial Diversity and Case Outcomes in Federal Courts
Ryan Copus, Ryan Hübert & Paige Pellaton
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are federal lawsuits resolved differently based on the race or gender of the judges assigned to hear them? Recent empirical research posits that women and judges of color decide cases more liberally, at least in some identity-salient areas of law. However, these studies analyze small numbers of cases and judges, and use research designs that limit their causal interpretations. Using an original dataset of all civil rights cases filed in 20 federal district courts over multiple decades and a strong causal identification strategy, we find that assignment of cases to judges of color or women has no statistically significant effect on case outcomes among Democratic appointees. However, it causes more conservative outcomes among Republican appointees. We explain these results with a theory of bargaining over judicial appointments in which Republican presidents take advantage of Democrats’ preference for diversity on the bench to appoint more conservative judges.
Partisan Panel Composition and Reliance on Earlier Opinions in the Circuit Courts
Stuart Minor Benjamin, ByungKoo Kim & Kevin Quinn
Journal of Law and Empirical Analysis, May 2024
Abstract:
Does the partisan composition of three-judge panels affect how earlier opinions are treated and thus how the law develops? Using a novel data set of Shepard's treatments for all cases decided in the U.S. courts of appeals from 1974 to 2017, we investigate three different versions of this question. First, are panels composed of three Democratic (Republican) appointees more likely to follow opinions decided by panels of three Democratic (Republican) appointees than are panels composed of three Republican (Democratic) appointees? Second, does the presence of a single out-party judge change how a panel relies on earlier decisions compared to what one would expect from a panel with homogeneous partisanship? Finally, does the size of these potential partisan effects change over time in a way that would be consistent with partisan polarization on the courts? We find that partisanship does, in fact, structure whether earlier opinions are followed and that these partisan effects have grown over time -- particularly within the subset of cases that we believe are most likely to be ideologically salient. Since legal doctrine is developed by building upon or diminishing past opinions, these results have important implications for our understanding of the development of the law.
Guilt and Guilty Pleas
Andrew Little & Hannah Simpson
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Plea bargaining figures heavily in criminal justice systems in the United States and, increasingly, around the globe. Conventional wisdom holds that plea bargaining generates efficiency gains for all parties, while sorting the guilty from the innocent. We build a series of formal models to consider the relationship between a defendant’s guilt and her likelihood of pleading guilty. In an inversion of the conventional wisdom, we show that under a range of empirically plausible scenarios -- for example, if criminals are more risk-seeking than the wrongfully accused, or if prosecutors derive a career benefit from trial wins -- the innocent are more likely than the guilty to plea bargain.
Gendered Judicial Opinions
Michael Livermore et al.
Journal of Law and Empirical Analysis, May 2024
Abstract:
In this paper we investigate whether gender is associated with the content of judicial opinions in the U.S. courts of appeals. Using a topic model analysis, we find that gender is a significant predictor of the content of judicial opinions. Two causal pathways could explain this result: (1) men and women judges write differently about the same cases; (2) men and women judges write about different cases, either due to assignment or selection effects. To untangle these two pathways, we carry out three additional analyses. First, we examine whether the United States as a party is associated with judge gender. We next examine whether case codes are associated with judge gender. Finally, we examine the relationship between topic prevalence and gender, controlling for case codes. Our findings lend greater support to the second pathway than the first. This result raises the prospect that prior work on gender-based differences in judicial behavior may be confounded by assignment or selection effects. Our results also raise normative concerns about gender disparities in voice and influence in the U.S. courts.
Economic nationalism and the home court advantage
Arnab Choudhury, Srividya Jandhyala & Anand Nandkumar
Strategic Management Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political and regulatory actors routinely adopt or enforce policies to protect domestic firms at the expense of foreign firms. However, since courts are expected to be neutral and act independently, a question arises whether (and why) they discriminate against foreign firms. We argue that the courts are nationalistic, which emanates from judges differentiating between in-group (domestic) and out-group (foreign) members. In a sample of 58,754 patent disputes adjudicated by US federal district courts between 1983 and 2016, we find domestic patent holders and challengers are more successful than their foreign counterparts. Rulings involving foreign firms are more likely to exhibit nationalistic rhetoric. Judicial ideology moderates the differential odds of success between domestic and foreign firms. Thus, the legal system is another source of economic nationalism.
Forum Shopping and Legal Labor Markets: Evidence from the Court Competition Era
Chad Brown, Jeronimo Carballo & Alessandro Peri
Journal of Law and Economics, May 2024, Pages 415–444
Abstract:
Focusing on Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations of publicly listed firms during the court competition era (1991–96), we document local legal employment effects of forum shopping, a stipulation of the law that allows firms to file for bankruptcy far from their headquarters. Bankruptcy shocks increase legal-sector employment in the bankrupt firm’s locale, but forum shopping nullifies this effect. Employment gains of received forum-shopped cases are concentrated in Delaware, with no effect in other receiving forums. Quantification shows that Delaware handled these forum-shopped bankruptcies with just one-fifth of the additional legal workforce that would have been needed if the cases were handled in the firms’ locales. This increase in productivity also coincides with substantial missed potential employment gains in communities where bankruptcies were diverted through forum shopping. The analysis uncovers meaningful effects of forum shopping on local legal labor markets, so far overlooked in the policy debate.
Institutional Change Affects Perceived and Personal Intergroup Attitudes
Kate Ratliff, Jacqueline Chen & Nicole Lofaro
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research tested whether institutional change impacts policy support and attitudes toward the social groups impacted by policy change. Study 1 demonstrated across a variety of topics that, when a hypothetical state legislature banned (vs. affirmed) a practice (e.g., allowing companies to implement mandatory anti-racism training), participants perceived less support for the policy and more negative attitudes toward the group impacted (e.g., Black Americans). Study 2, a longitudinal study, investigated the short- and long-term impact of real-world policy change -- the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization ruling that gave states the right to restrict access to abortion. Although the ruling did not produce lasting change in personal support for abortion restriction, it did lead participants to perceive more support for traditional gender roles and to personally endorse traditional gender attitudes more strongly. These results demonstrate the power of institutional policies to influence individually held intergroup attitudes.
The Role of Judge Ideology in Strategic Retirements in U.S. Federal Courts
John Deschler & Maya Sen
Journal of Law and Empirical Analysis, May 2024
Abstract:
The widely recognized phenomenon of federal judges retiring strategically has key implications for the composition of the judiciary, particularly given polarization between the two U.S. political parties. Using fine-grained measures of judicial ideology, we examine how ideology shapes such strategic retirements. First, we show that since Reagan’s election, Democratic appointees to lower federal courts have been more likely to retire strategically than Republican ones. Second, we find that more ideologically conservative Republican appointees are more likely to strategically retire than are moderate Republican appointees but only suggestive evidence of a similar pattern among more liberal Democratic appointees. Third, as explanation, we find that moderate Republican appointees appear to “wait out” retiring strategically under more conservative recent presidents, such as Donald Trump, opting instead to retire under Democrats such as Joe Biden. Taken together, our results offer a key insight: ideology, and not just party, can be an important factor in driving strategic retirement.
Exploring the influence of wealth on judicial decision making
Banks Miller & Brett Curry
Social Science Quarterly, July 2024, Pages 1193-1204
Methods: We obtain data on federal appellate judges’ wealth and explore its influence in cases involving economic issues. We estimate logit models controlling for other factors and include fixed effects for circuit, specific issue area, and year of the decision. The models consider both the main effects of wealth and its potential interaction with judicial ideology to influence decision making.
Results: We find no direct relationship between a judge's wealth and her decision making in economic cases. However, wealth interacts with ideology to exert a significant influence on decision making; here, greater wealth amplifies the ideological predilections of more conservative judges.