This means war
Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention
Ronald Krebs & Jennifer Spindel
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do - as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain - hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies' faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener's will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies' security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners' hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.
Civilian Casualties, Humanitarian Aid, and Insurgent Violence in Civil Wars
Jason Lyall
Yale Working Paper, July 2018
Abstract:
Indiscriminate violence against civilians has long been viewed as a catalyst for new rounds of violence in civil wars. Can humanitarian assistance reduce violence after civilians have been harmed? Crossnational studies are pessimistic, drawing a connection between humanitarian aid and increased civil war violence, lethality, and duration. To date, however, we have few subnational studies of wartime aid and subsequent violence. To examine this relationship, I draw on the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP II), a USAID-funded initiative that investigated 1,061 civilian casualty incidents (2011-13). Aid was assigned as-if randomly to about half (55.8%) of these incidents, facilitating counterfactual estimation of how assistance affected Taliban attacks against the International Security Assistance Force, Afghan forces, and civilians. Challenging prior studies, ACAP was associated with an average 23% reduction in attacks against ISAF, but not Afghan forces or civilians, at the village level for up to two years after the initial incident.
The Effectiveness of Army Field Manual Interrogation Approaches for Educing Information and Building Rapport
Misty Duke et al.
Law and Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
In 2016, the U.S. Congress mandated that federal intelligence interrogators adhere to the methods of the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 2-22.3 (AFM) and that the manual be revised based upon empirically based evaluations of the interrogation methods' effectiveness with interviewees motivated to withhold information. In the present study, 120 participants took part in a testing situation in which half were induced to cheat. All participants were then accused of cheating and interrogated with either (a) a combination of AFM interrogation approaches that focused on the potential benefits of cooperation with the interviewer (cooperation-focused condition), or (b) a combination of AFM approaches that focused on the potential risks of withholding information (withholding-focused condition). Participants who cheated on the test were significantly more likely to admit their wrongdoing and to provide additional relevant information when interrogated with the withholding-focused approaches than when questioned with the cooperation-focused approaches. The "we know all" AFM approach was especially effective for eliciting truthful admission-related details. Participants reported high rapport with the interrogator in both the cooperation-focused and withholding-focused conditions. These findings indicate that the we-know-all approach can be effective for maintaining rapport and eliciting accurate information in brief interrogations.
Clash of civilizations demystified
Gunes Gokmen
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper provides empirical evidence in support of the clash-of-civilizations view on the nature of interstate conflicts in the post-Cold War era. First, we show that countries belonging to different civilizations have a higher probability of interstate conflict before and after the Cold War period, but not during the Cold War. Second, we explain the differential impact of civilizations on conflict over time by providing evidence that civilizational differences were suppressed during the Cold War by ideology and super-power camps. Third, we provide evidence that the component of civilizations that matters the most for conflict in the post-Cold War period is language, and not religion. Fourth, we analyze the long-term cultural, geographical and historical determinants of civilizational differences, and show that language has the largest explanatory power.
Preventing Plunder: Military Technology, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Growth
Joshua Hendrickson, Alexander William Salter & Brian Albrecht
Journal of Macroeconomics, forthcoming
Abstract:
A growing body of research highlights the correlation between strong, centralized states and economic growth. Given the important role that national defense has played in the development of the state, it seems as though this would imply some relationship between military expenditures and economic development. However, there is no consensus on the direction of the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth. In this paper, we propose a resolution to this puzzle. We argue that military technology is a limiting factor for wealth (and therefore capital) accumulation. Since wealth must be protected from plunder and/or destruction, the amount of wealth that can be accumulated is constrained by a society's ability to adequately defend it. We present a theoretical model consistent with this idea and perform a Monte Carlo experiment to determine the implications of this hypothesis for empirical work. We find that the long-run relationship between military expenditures and private production is positive. However, in sample sizes consistent with existing data, the relationship is ambiguous. As a result, we provide support for this idea by relying on historical examples consistent with our hypothesis. Finally, we consider the implications of our hypothesis for the development of state capacity.
A Clash of Norms? How Reciprocity and International Humanitarian Law affect American Opinion on the Treatment of POWs
Jonathan Chu
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Reciprocity is one of the oldest principles of warfare, but humanitarian norms embedded in international humanitarian law (IHL) prohibit reciprocity over various wartime acts. When it comes to the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), how do these conflicting norms shape public opinion? One perspective is that citizens who learn about IHL acquire an unconditional aversion to abusing POWs. Alternatively, people may understand IHL as a conditional commitment that instead strengthens their approval for reciprocal conduct. Survey experiments fielded in the United States support the latter view: people's preferences depend on the enemy's behavior, and this "reciprocity effect" is largest among those who believe that the United States is legally committed to treating POWs humanely. Puzzlingly, prior studies do not find a reciprocity effect, but this is due to their use of a no-information experimental control group, which led to a lack of control over the subjects' assumptions about the survey.
More legislation, more violence? The impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC
Nik Stoop, Marijke Verpoorten & Peter van der Windt
PLoS ONE, August 2018
Abstract:
The Dodd Frank Act was passed by the US Congress in July 2010 and included a provision - Section 1502 - that aimed to break the link between conflict and minerals in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. To date there is only one rigorous quantitative analysis that investigates the impact of Dodd-Frank on local conflict events. Looking at the short-term impact (2011-2012), it finds that the policy backfired. This study builds on a larger, more representative, dataset of mining sites and extends the time horizon by three years (2013-2015). The results indicate that the policy also backfired in the longer run, especially in areas home to gold mines. For territories with the average number of gold mines, the introduction of Dodd-Frank increased the incidence of battles with 44%; looting with 51% and violence against civilians with 28%, compared to pre-Dodd Frank averages. Delving deeper into the impact of the conflict minerals legislation is important, as President Trump suspended the legislation in February 2017 for a two-year period, ordering his administration to replace it with another policy.
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces and the Demand for Sex Trafficking
Sam Bell, Michael Flynn & Carla Martinez Machain
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
U.N. peacekeeping missions succeed in preventing the resumption of conflict and saving lives. At the same time, a series of sexual exploitation and abuse scandals since the early 2000s has raised concerns about the conduct of peacekeepers. We examine a related, but generally overlooked, potential negative externality of peacekeeping missions: the forced trafficking of sex workers. We argue that U.N. peacekeepers increase demand for sex work and that this demand may be met through human trafficking for forced prostitution. Using data on U.N. peacekeeping missions between 2001 and 2011, we evaluate the effect of a peacekeeper presence on human sex trafficking in and around the host state. We find that the presence of U.N. peacekeeping forces correlates positively with a state being cited as a destination for forced prostitution. This has important implications for the future deployment of peacekeeping forces around the world.
It Takes Two to Tango: Autocratic underbalancing, regime legitimacy and China's responses to India's rise
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
What factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived threats and why might they fail to balance appropriately? I posit that autocratic leaders may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing so, it preserves regime legitimacy. Specifically, the desire to promote a positive image to one's domestic public creates incentives to publicly downplay a rival's military progress, which then affects the state's ability to mobilize resources to respond to the growing threat. I test this theory in the case of China's response to India's military rise. This research contributes to balancing theory and empirical work on East Asian security.
International Military Interventions and Transnational Terrorist Backlash
James Piazza & Seung-Whan Choi
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are states that engage in foreign military interventions vulnerable to subsequent transnational terrorist attacks? If so, do all types of foreign interventions stimulate terrorism? Using data on international military interventions for 125 to 182 countries during the period from 1970 to 2005, we demonstrate that states experience more terrorism after they engage in military interventions. In particular, politico-strategic use of military force abroad - for example, interference in another country's domestic disputes, territorial interventions, or interventions to affect local politics and policy - leads to increased subsequent transnational terrorist attacks for the intervener. In contrast, socioeconomic foreign military interventions, such as those geared toward providing humanitarian relief, protecting social groups, or securing economic interests, do not lead to an increase in transnational terrorist attacks against intervening states.
Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network
Brandon Kinne
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Bilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, are now the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes, DCAs have been largely ignored by scholars. Why have DCAs proliferated? I develop a theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueled demand for DCAs. States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. Yet, demand alone cannot explain DCA proliferation; to cooperate, governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. I show that network influences increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. DCAs become easier to sign as more states sign them. I identify two specific network influences - preferential attachment and triadic closure - and show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.
High Stakes and Low Bars: How International Recognition Shapes the Conduct of Civil Wars
Marika Landau-Wells
International Security, Summer 2018, Pages 100-137
Abstract:
When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns - all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.
Antecedents of war: The geopolitics of low oil prices and decelerating financial liquidity
Hany Abdel-Latif & Mahmoud El-Gamal
Applied Economics Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
We investigate the joint dynamics of oil prices, financial liquidity and geopolitical risk, within a multi-country global vector autoregressive model. We find that low oil prices are expected to trigger higher levels of geopolitical risk and that decelerating financial liquidity serves as an accelerator.