Signals Intelligence
Anger expressions and coercive credibility in international crises
Hohyun Yoon
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why are some threats more credible than others? I argue that leaders' anger expressions are a previously underappreciated source of coercive credibility. Specifically, leaders who express anger appear more credible because targets believe they are less sensitive to the costs of conflict. I test this argument through quantitative analysis of a novel dataset of world leaders' public statements in crises from 1946 to 1996 and a U.S.-based survey experiment designed to test the mechanism. The observational evidence reveals that anger expressions increase the likelihood a threat will succeed. The experiment shows that anger expressions cause targets to infer greater resolve and that non-angry threats carry little credibility -- and might even backfire. These findings not only shed light on a unique source of threat credibility but also highlight the crucial role of emotions in international relations with new data measuring political leaders' emotional expressions over time and space.
Back to Bipolarity: How China's Rise Transformed the Balance of Power
Jennifer Lind
International Security, Fall 2024, Pages 7-55
Abstract:
China's rise, Russia's military resurgence, and India's economic growth have prompted debates about the end of unipolarity and the future balance of power. Such debates are a staple of international politics; indeed, in the late twentieth century, many observers warned that Japan and the Soviet Union would overtake the United States. Yet scholars and policymakers evince little agreement on how to define power or measure the distribution of power. This article introduces an inductive method for comparing national power. I empirically validate common metrics of national capabilities -- economic and military -- by assessing their ability to both predict known balances of power across historical systems (1820-1990) and distinguish between great powers and other countries. This method yields three important findings. First, large gaps in national capabilities between great powers and even superpowers have been common throughout history. Great powers need not achieve parity with the leading state to engage in a dangerous security competition. Second, this method shows that China on most dimensions is not only a great power but a superpower. Third, neither Russia nor India is a great power. The system is bipolar. These findings inform debates about the stability of international politics and the future of international order and suggest the likelihood of shifts in U.S. grand strategy and alliances.
Denying the Obvious: Why Do Nominally Covert Actions Avoid Escalation?
Chase Bloch & Roseanne McManus
International Organization, Summer 2024, Pages 600-624
Abstract:
In 2014, Russia denied that its military was assisting separatists in eastern Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence. Why do countries bother to deny hostile actions like this even when they are obvious? Scholars have argued that making hostile actions covert can reduce pressure on the target state to escalate. Yet it is not clear whether this claim applies when evidence of responsibility for the action is publicly available. We use three survey experiments to test whether denying responsibility for an action in the presence of contradictory evidence truly dampens demand for escalation among the public in the target state. We also test three causal mechanisms that might explain this: a rationalist reputation mechanism, a psychological mechanism, and an uncertainty mechanism. We do find a de-escalatory effect of noncredible denials. The effect is mediated through all three proposed causal mechanisms, but uncertainty and reputational concern have the most consistent effect.
Can Humanity Achieve a Century of Nuclear Peace? Expert Forecasts of Nuclear Risk
Bridget Williams et al.
Forecasting Research Institute Working Paper, October 2024
Abstract:
While the world has avoided large-scale nuclear war, questions remain about the role of chance versus policy choices in preventing such events. This study systematically assesses expert beliefs about the probability of a nuclear catastrophe by 2045, the centenary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We define a nuclear catastrophe as an event where nuclear weapons cause the death of at least 10 million people. Through a combination of expert interviews and surveys, 110 domain experts and 41 expert forecasters ("superforecasters") predicted the likelihood of nuclear conflict, explained the mechanisms underlying their predictions, and forecasted the impact of specific tractable policies on the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe. Experts assigned a median 5% probability of a nuclear catastrophe by 2045, while superforecasters put the probability at 1%. Factors contributing to higher risk estimates included ongoing geopolitical tensions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and technological vulnerabilities. Lower risk estimates highlighted the continued effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Although Russia and NATO was the adversarial domain thought most likely to cause a nuclear catastrophe, experts believe that risks are dispersed roughly uniformly across regional conflict theaters (Russia and NATO, China and the USA, the Korean Peninsula, India and Pakistan, and Israel and Iran). Participants believe that the implementation of a bundle of six tractable policies, including the establishment of a crisis communications network and the implementation of failsafe reviews, would together halve the risk of a nuclear catastrophe.
Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory
Stephen Chaudoin & Sarah Hummel
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why might female leaders of democratic countries commit more money, equipment, soldiers, and other resources to interstate conflicts than male leaders? We argue that gender bias in the process of democratic election helps explain this behavior. Since running for office is generally more costly for women than for men, only women who place a higher value on winning competitions will choose to run. After election, they also devote more resources to pursuing victory in conflict situations. To provide microfoundational evidence for this claim, we analyze data from an online laboratory game featuring real-time group play in which participants chose to run for election, conducted a simple campaign, and represented their group in a contest game if elected. Women with a higher nonmonetary value to winning were more likely to self-select into candidacy, and when victorious, they spent more resources on intergroup contests than male elected leaders. The data suggest that electoral selection plays an important role in observed differences between male and female leaders in the real world.
The limits of diplomacy by treaty: Evidence from China's bilateral investment treaty program
Adam Chilton & Weijia Rao
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, December 2024, Pages 1023-1101
Abstract:
The web of over 3000 Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") is the primary body of international law regulating cross-border investments. Research suggests that these treaties may have had a limited impact on promoting new investments, but that they still may have helped to improve countries' political relationships. In this paper, we document that this pattern was reversed for one of the most prolific signers of BITs: China. Using a stacked-event research design, we find that Chinese BITs are associated with an increase in Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Flows but a divergence in voting patterns at the United Nations. We then explore two explanations for why the Chinese BIT program led to increased investment while also producing foreign policy divergence: that the domestic political costs of economic engagement with China push countries away, and that there are offsetting international pressures that have stronger pulls than China's efforts. We find no support for the domestic political costs explanation, but we do find evidence that the countries that received increased aid from the United States after signing a Chinese BIT had greater foreign policy divergence with China.
The Military VSL
Thomas Kniesner, Ryan Sullivan & Kip Viscusi
Naval Postgraduate School Working Paper, November 2024
Abstract:
Our research reviews theory and empirical evidence in the economics literature and provides a standard value of a statistical life (VSL) applicable to the Department of Defense (DOD). We follow Viscusi (2018a) by conducting a meta-analysis consisting of 1,025 VSL estimates from 68 different labor market studies and find a best-set average VSL estimate of $11.8 million (US$2021) across all studies. For DOD analysts and practitioners, we advocate using our best-set VSL estimate for the vast majority of benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) within the DOD. In addition to providing a VSL benchmark to use in DOD BCAs, we also breakdown casualty types and provide a range of VSL estimates to use in sensitivity analyses. Employing restricted data from the DOD on over 6,700 U.S. military fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to 2021 we show that (1) fatalities are highly concentrated among young, white, and enlisted males, and that (2) fatality rates in the Army and Marines are in contrast to the low number of fatalities (less than 5%) in the Air Force and Navy. Applying standard VSL pay grade and income adjustments to U.S. military fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq, we find adjusted VSL estimates ranging in value from $3.2 million to $27.6 million per statistical life (US$2021).
The Myth of a Bipartisan Golden Age for U.S. Foreign Policy: The Truman-Eisenhower Consensus Remains
Jeffrey Friedman
International Security, Fall 2024, Pages 97-134
Abstract:
Scholars and practitioners of U.S. foreign policy commonly describe the early Cold War as a lost golden age of bipartisan consensus. This article uses public opinion data, congressional voting patterns, and party platform statements to refute this conventional wisdom. In fact, the core internationalist principles that enjoyed bipartisan agreement during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations retain widespread approval from Democrats and Republicans today. Enduring support for this Truman-Eisenhower consensus is concealed by the way that recent presidents have enlarged the United States' foreign policy agenda to pursue policies that historically did not generate bipartisanship, such as fighting climate change or conducting decades-long projects in armed nation-building. Rising political divisions in U.S. foreign policy are thus primarily a result of Democrats and Republicans deploying global influence in new ways rather than renouncing traditional international commitments. These findings refute widespread claims that political polarization has undermined traditional conceptions of U.S. global leadership or depleted Washington's usable power.
Border fortification and legibility: Evidence from Afghanistan
Christopher Blair
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
States often fortify their borders against militant threats. How do these efforts shape civilian welfare and perceptions in borderland communities? I conceptualize border fortification as a legibility-building endeavor. By bolstering state reach in areas of weak historical penetration, fortification enhances the government's capacity for monitoring, administration, and control. Yet, expanding state authority also disrupts traditional cross-border markets. A trade-off between security and corruption emerges in consequence. I provide evidence for this theory in a difference-in-differences framework, combining administrative records on violence and representative data from a NATO-commissioned survey fielded across Afghanistan. Fortification facilitates government information-collection, improving security provision and fostering civilian reliance on state forces. Enhanced state capacity is countervailed by negative economic impacts. By disturbing the informal borderland economy, fortification fuels criminalization and local opposition. Civilians rely on illicit economic entrepreneurs to sustain traditional market access. Higher smuggling rents fuel official corruption and bribe-taking. The findings point to a key dilemma inherent in border fortification strategies.