Saving Politics
Mixed-Member Proportional Representation and the U.S. House of Representatives
Alex Keena, Oscar Pocasangre & Natasha Romero Moskala
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The use of single-seat districts and majoritarian rules for legislative elections is associated with many problems in American politics. However, this method of electing legislators to the U.S. House of Representatives can be reformed through acts of Congress. We investigate the potential of mixed-member electoral systems, which have gained popularity among reformers for potentially providing the "best of both worlds." We review the comparative scholarship to clarify the mechanics of mixed-member systems, particularly how mixed-member proportional systems (MMP) balance the representational goals of dyadic, localized representation with proportional party representation. We model an MMP system for the House to see whether it can address problems such as the two-party system and gerrymandering. Using data from the 2024 House elections and the 2025 mid-decade redistricting, we find that an MMP system that significantly expands the size of the House would improve the alignment of votes to seats at the state level, increase third party seats, and neutralize partisan bias in gerrymandering. Our analysis demonstrates that specific design choices (assembly size, seat linkage, and apportionment formulas) shape the system's effectiveness. Our exercise underscores the potential benefits and challenges of MMP as a reform option for the U.S.
Delegate, Trustee, or Personal: Preferences for Different Forms of Representation in America
Michael Barber, Ryan Davis & Adam Michael Dynes
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do voters have an intrinsic preference for democracy? Assessing attitudes toward trustee or delegate models of representation risks conflating intrinsic and instrumental orientations toward democracy. To clarify the gap between intrinsic and instrumental support for political representation, we use a survey experiment to investigate whether US voters want representatives to enact the individual voter's own preferences, regardless of countervailing attitudes held by the representative themselves or by their constituents. We find considerable support for this third, personal model of representation. We argue that this poses two important questions for democratic theorists. First, how do citizens' observed preferences for dictating outcomes challenge normative democratic principles of representation? Furthermore, if we rethink how citizens engage in democratic processes, how does it change our understanding of democracy's intrinsic worth in the public?
Filibusted? The mixed effects of "going nuclear"
Adam Ramey
Party Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Perennial gridlock in Washington has led to many political and media elites calling for an end to the filibuster. But would it matter? In this paper, we derive a series of legislative bargaining models and show that eliminating the filibuster would likely affect gridlock in a narrow set of circumstances. Using data on gridlock from Binder (2015), we conduct simulations to examine the effect of removing the filibuster on outcomes. The results demonstrate that, while some believe that getting rid of the filibuster is a panacea, the practical effects of doing so are more muted.
Hidden in Plain Sight: Questions for the Record in Lower Court Confirmations
Morrgan Herlihy
Journal of Law and Courts, forthcoming
Abstract:
Senatorial scrutiny of judicial nominees has long centered on the role of confirmation hearings in advice and consent, but senators draw on multiple sources of information when evaluating nominees for lifetime appointments to the federal bench. Questions for the Record (QFRs) -- written questions submitted to nominees after the conclusion of their hearings -- are a common yet understudied component of the Judiciary Committee's vetting process. I analyze the use of QFRs for all Circuit Court of Appeals nominees from 2001 to 2022, finding that partisan differences between the nominating president and senator strongly structure who submits them, while interest group opposition to a nominee, though significant, plays a more modest role than it does in senators' question-asking behavior during confirmation hearings. Moreover, senators' use of QFRs has increased substantially in recent sessions of Congress, especially following reforms to the filibuster in 2013. These findings suggest that QFRs are not simply an extension of hearing questions. Instead, they serve their own vetting functions for Committee senators, particularly for outpartisans, those highly engaged in the process, and when time constraints may limit other means of vetting.
When portfolios speak: Identity signaling in congressional trading
Young Jae Choi & Xiang Gao
Finance Research Letters, June 2026
Abstract:
We investigate whether legislators use equity trading as a form of political expression. Using comprehensive congressional transaction data, we document a robust gender-based asymmetry: male legislators allocate significantly more capital to firms with greater female board representation, whereas female legislators exhibit no comparable pattern. Exploiting California Senate Bill 826 and geographic variation in the local supply of female directors as sources of exogenous variation in board gender composition, we identify a causal effect on legislators' investment activity. The evidence supports a signaling mechanism: male legislators -- especially Democrats, those facing imminent elections, and those representing female-majority constituencies -- use observable portfolio choices to signal support for gender diversity, rather than trading on superior firm performance or lower risk associated with gender-diverse boards. Overall, our findings suggest that for U.S. legislators, the stock market functions not only as a venue for wealth accumulation but also as a stage for identity signaling.
Legislative Effectiveness, Progressive Ambition, and Electoral Success
Danielle Thomsen et al.
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are effective state lawmakers more likely than ineffective ones to be elected to Congress? We draw on a new dataset of state legislative effectiveness scores from 1993 to 2018 to examine the relationship between lawmaker effectiveness and the decision to run for, and ultimately be elected to, the U.S. House of Representatives. We find that more effective state lawmakers are more likely to enter Congress than ineffective lawmakers. This pattern is due more to the progressive ambition of candidates than to voter decisions. Specifically, within citizen state legislatures, more effective lawmakers are much more likely to run for U.S. House seats than are their less effective counterparts. In highly professional state legislatures, however, more effective lawmakers are more likely to run for Congress only when presented with the opportunity of an open seat. Our analysis finds no relationship between a state legislator's lawmaking effectiveness and their likelihood of winning primary or general House elections.
News They Don't Hear: Why Americans Trust Local and State Governments More
Todd Donovan, Caroline Tolbert & Shaun Bowler
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many people hear less news about state and local governments than national government, and many trust state and local governments more. We propose different levels of trust are related to consumption of news, which may be more available and critical at the national than subnational level. We expect differential effects on trust associated with the level of government people report hearing the most about: a positive relationship with hearing most about local or state governments, and a negative relationship with hearing most about the national government. Using a nationally representative opinion sample, we find results consistent with these expectations. Further, people trusted state governments less in states where there were more news outlets, suggesting in places where news remains people may be less trusting. A survey experiment designed as another test of this: respondents were randomly assigned critical information about actions of elected officials at each level of government. The treatments substantially eroded trust in local and state governments, but not in the national government, where trust was already low. Trust in subnational governments may be higher than trust in the national government, in part, because more people hear less critical news about local and state politics than national politics.
Will Constituents Simply Take Their Elected Representatives' Word for It?
Dennis Chong & Morris Levy
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political communications research has found that elites enjoy wide latitude to shape mass opinion but also identified important constraints on opinion leadership in competitive democracies. To win over the public, political leaders must generally mobilize party loyalties, secure interest group endorsements, and make persuasive arguments to support their views. Influential research (Broockman & Butler, 2017) calls these constraints into question by raising the possibility that elected officials can sway their constituents' opinions about policy merely by declaring their own stances, without providing substantive justifications or group cues. Such "position adoption," in which ordinary citizens simply defer to politicians' authority, would mean that the public is more pliant than previous research suggests. To examine this possibility, we report on four experimental studies that assess the effect of unelaborated "position-taking cues" from elected representatives on their constituents' policy opinions. We find no evidence that the bare articulation of a representative's position changes constituents' opinions, whereas many of the group cues and substantive arguments included in these experiments have sizable influences on opinions measured in our studies. These results cast doubt on the most pessimistic interpretation of elite opinion leadership.
Tax Breaks for Swing States? Political Bargaining, Targeted Policies, and Firm Outcomes
Sahil Raina & Sheng-Jun Xu
Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine how firms are affected by the political bargaining power of their headquarters' region. Exploiting variation in the strategic importance of swing states stemming from shifting partisan balance in the U.S. Senate, we find that corporate valuations and investments positively respond to increases in regional political influence. We verify the valuation findings using an event study based on the 2021 Georgia runoff election that unexpectedly produced a 50-50 balance in the Senate. We investigate potential policy mechanisms and find that tax incentives constitute the most likely channel through which firms benefit from the political bargaining power of their headquarters' region.
Bank Lending in U.S. Presidential Elections
Alexander Dentler & Enzo Rossi
Southern Economic Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide evidence of a political lending cycle in U.S. presidential elections characterized by an increase in credit supply by large banks in swing states. The credit expansion is independent of the incumbent's party, revealing a non-partisan preference for political continuity. Growth in mortgage and small business loans is substantial, but does not affect credit quality.