Republics for the People
Have Autocrats Governed for the Long Term?
Emanuele Millemaci, Fabio Monteforte & Jonathan Temple
Kyklos, forthcoming
Abstract:
The short answer is: probably not. We infer the priorities of national governments from observed outcomes, constructing a statistical proxy for long-term benevolence. Using data between 1960 and 2019 for more than 100 countries, we show that, on average, democracies score more highly on our measure. We then investigate whether variation in long-term benevolence can explain the ‘autocratic gamble’ -- the well-known tendency for growth rates to vary more widely across autocracies than across democracies. We show that the distribution of long-term benevolence under democracy first-order stochastically dominates its distribution under autocracy. Put differently, although there is an autocratic gamble in growth rates, there is no autocratic gamble in wider development outcomes. The rapid growth seen in some autocracies probably originates in regime self-interest rather than unusually benevolent leadership.
Why Dictators Use Newspeak?
Alexander Libman, Daniil Romanov & Alexei Zakharov
Yale Working Paper, November 2024
Abstract:
In many countries, control over language has been an important element of authoritarian rule: by labeling social phenomena in certain ways, dictators tried to influence their perception by their subjects. Orwell's Newspeak is the most powerful literary description of these practices. While the existence of Newspeak in many autocracies is indisputable, there has hardly been any empirical research investigating the effectiveness of newspeak-do subjects really react on the choice of words or see through the intentions of the regime to manipulate them? Using the case of Putin's Russia in 2024 and applying a unique pre-registered online experiment (N = 4, 000), we show that Newspeak matters politically. In particular, we look at how subjects react on the choice of the specific words to describe Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Russian government has legally prohibited the term 'war', mandating the use of the term 'special military operation' instead. We demonstrate that respondents exposed to the 'special military operation' framing, as opposed to 'military conflict,' exhibited less anxiety and more pride in relation to ongoing events. Additionally, these respondents expressed lower levels of civic engagement and were less willing to participate in protests with political or economic demands. Our findings contribute to the literature on authoritarian propaganda narratives and highlight the role of Newspeak in shaping political apathy within autocratic contexts.
Mimicking Democracy: The Legitimizing Role of Redistributionist Propaganda in Autocracies
Hsu Yumin Wang & Eddy Yeung
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Autocrats often disseminate propaganda to boast about their redistributive efforts. Why is such propaganda so prevalent in autocracies? We propose a novel explanation: redistributionist propaganda helps autocrats fortify a façade of democracy. Our argument is premised on nuanced understandings of democracy among the masses: many citizens do not hold a strict, procedural view of democracy; instead, they often understand democracy through the lens of social equity. Exploiting such nuanced understandings of democracy, autocrats can deploy redistributionist propaganda to manipulate public opinion on how “equity-promoting” -- and therefore how “democracy-promoting” -- the regime is. To evaluate our argument, we first demonstrate with ex-tensive cross-national survey data that perceived social equity strongly predicts perceived democratic legitimacy among global citizens. We then probe the causal effect of redistributionist propaganda by using a preregistered survey experiment that exploits real-world propaganda material in China. Consistent with our argument, respondents exposed to redistributionist propaganda evaluated China’s democracy more positively.
The “Case” for Independent Courts: The Insurance Theory of Judicialization in Autocracies
Taraleigh Davis
Journal of Law and Courts, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why would authoritarian rulers allow for an independent judiciary that could constrain their power? This study extends the insurance theory of judicial independence to autocratic contexts, arguing that when leaders perceive a higher risk of losing office, they become more likely to tolerate or create independent courts as a safeguard against potential post-exit reprisals. Using a novel two-stage analytical approach, I construct a hazard rate for each country year from the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic regime dataset, based on factors directly observable to autocratic leaders. This hazard rate serves as a proxy for perceived risk of losing power. My findings provide robust evidence that higher perceived risk is significantly associated with greater judicial independence in autocratic regimes, even when controlling for economic development, regime longevity, and court age. This research offers crucial insights into autocratic governance, demonstrating that promoting judicial independence can be a calculated strategy for regime survival rather than merely a democratic concession.
Race, shaming, and international human rights
Zoltán Búzás & Lotem Bassan-Nygate
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can human rights organizations (HROs) shame governments without fueling racism against diasporas or appearing racist? To what extent can shamed governments recover public support lost to shaming by accusing their critics of racism? Employing two U.S.-based survey experiments involving 6,739 respondents and 11 prominent HRO interviews, we offer three novel findings. First, shaming decreased support for shamed countries (Israel and China) but did not fuel racism (antisemitism and anti-Asianism). If shamers face a racial dilemma, it is less about how to shame without fueling racism and more about how to shame without appearing racist. Our second finding points toward a solution: when shaming included an anti-racist cue denouncing racism, respondents perceived it as less racist. Finally, shamed governments can employ racial countershaming to recover some, but not all, of the public support lost to shaming. We contribute to the international relations shaming literature and offer recommendations about racially responsible shaming.
The “KGB Wanted List” and the Evolving Soviet Pursuit of Defectors
Kevin Riehle
Journal of Cold War Studies, Summer 2024, Pages 37–60
Abstract:
The 1969 edition of a document known as the “KGB Wanted List” was smuggled to the West in 1972 by a Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) officer who defected. The KGB periodically compiled the list to target people around the world whom the Soviet government accused of violating Soviet law, especially through defection. More than four decades after the 1969 list became available in the West, the Security Service of Ukraine -- the main counterintelligence agency in independent Ukraine -- declassified a later edition of the KGB list, dated 1979. This article compares these two editions of the list, analyzing the individuals included (and excluded) in each, the judicial sentences passed against subjects, and the KGB organizations responsible for handling their cases. The article shows that the Soviet view of defectors evolved throughout the Cold War and that the KGB was far from omnipotent even on Soviet territory. It further shows that post-Soviet Russia's pursuit of defectors bears many similarities to practices of the Soviet era, with equivalents of the KGB Wanted List reported in Russia today.
Fiscal Space and the Supply of Pro-Government Militias
Christian Lehmann
Journal of Public Economic Theory, December 2024
Abstract:
Militias hamper state-building by undermining the government's monopoly of violence, which creates an environment of anarchy. Yet many governments collaborate with them. These pro-government militias (PGMs), such as paramilitary groups, are not only a poor-country phenomenon, that is, economic growth does not seem to eradicate these armed nonstate actors: Intriguingly, cross-country data reveals a U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and PGM presence. This article presents an economic theory of PGM supply that can explain this puzzling relationship and provide actionable ways for international actors (e.g., UN) to discourage the emergence of PGMs. However, the theory also cautions that some common international policies (e.g., development aid) may unintentionally encourage PGM supply.
The Role of Pan-African Ideology in Ethnic Power Sharing
Janina Beiser-McGrath, Sam Erkiletian & Nils Metternich
International Organization, Summer 2024, Pages 460-500
Abstract:
What are the conditions under which governments form more ethnically inclusive coalitions? Previous contributions highlight strategic incentives as well as colonial and precolonial legacies as determinants of ethnically inclusive government coalitions but overlook the impact of political mobilization during the decolonization period. We argue that ideological exposure and commitment to the Pan-African anticolonial movement played a vital role in African leaders’ decisions to share power with other ethnic communities. We leverage novel data on African government leaders’ attendance at decolonization-era Pan-African conferences through a unique collection of conference delegate lists. Accounting for rival mechanisms, we find that African political elites who attended Pan-African conferences formed ethnically more inclusive government coalitions when they became government leaders. Our findings imply that the ideological influence and commitment signaled by conference attendance affected political leaders’ approach to form more inclusive governments and that ethnic coalitions have systematically unexplored legacies in the Pan-African decolonization movement.