Projecting Power
The Ideological Security Dilemma in International Relations: The Case of US–China Ideological Competition
Sungmin Cho
Perspectives on Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why does ideological competition between states intensify despite opportunities for coexistence? This article develops a theory of the ideological security dilemma to explain this puzzle. Like the military security dilemma, states may take defensive measures to safeguard the legitimacy of their own ideology, but these actions can be interpreted by others as ideological offensives aimed at weakening the legitimacy of rival ideologies. I test the theory through a process tracing of US–China ideological competition from 1991 to 2024. I find that although the United States initially hoped China would democratize voluntarily, democratizing China was not a central policy goal. Conversely, while China seeks global respect for its “China model,” actively exporting authoritarian ideology is not its goal either. Nevertheless, China perceives US efforts as aimed at regime change, prompting Beijing to promote the “China model” more assertively as a countermeasure to what it sees as a US ideological assault. This intensifies US fears of the global spread of authoritarianism and triggers further counteractions. This study integrates constructivist and realist approaches while drawing on insights from comparative politics on regime legitimacy and democratization.
Unnamed but Reassuring: Quasi-Secrecy and Public Support for Foreign Policy
Clara Suong
International Studies Quarterly, December 2025
Abstract:
How does quasi-secrecy -- the selective revelation of foreign policy secrets -- affect public attitudes toward the use of force by democracies? Existing research on secrecy and on public attitudes toward war has yet to consider the role of quasi-secrecy, such as unattributable communication by unnamed bureaucrats, in affecting public opinion about military action. I argue that unattributable communication can boost public support for the use of force by rallying individuals to infer policy success. My analyses of two survey experiments on nationally representative samples show that anonymous bureaucrats’ unattributable messages can rally individuals around a government’s use of covert action, relative to attributable messages. I also find that the positive effect of unattributable communication is informational, rather than partisan. The positive effect stems from its interaction with the audience’s inferences about success, rather than the political attributes of the source or the audience. By problematizing the previously understudied topic of quasi-secrecy in conflict processes, this paper contributes to existing literature on secrecy and on public opinion about foreign policy and generates important policy implications about the democratic foreign policymaking process.
Leveraging data science to investigate intelligence failures
Leonard Kern, Kristian Gustafson & Martin Ejnar Hansen
Intelligence and National Security, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article challenges the conventional assumption underpinning the ‘First Law of Intelligence Failure’ -- that warning signs are always available, but ignored, prior to intelligence breakdowns. Employing advanced natural language processing and machine learning techniques, the authors analyse declassified US State Department cables from the 1970s, focusing on two case studies often deemed intelligence failures: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution. Using semantic outlier and change-point detection algorithms, they test whether meaningful signals (‘signal in the noise’) or emergent patterns (‘connecting the dots’) were more prevalent prior to failure than in earlier, ‘successful’ periods. The study finds this is not consistently the case, suggesting that indicators are not uniformly available or discernible before failures occur. By demonstrating the limitations of this study, the article concludes that the binary framing of intelligence as either success or failure is analytically flawed and potentially misleading. It offers a proof-of-concept for applying data science to intelligence analysis and advocates for a more nuanced understanding based on baselines and deviations, rather than retrospective judgements shaped by hindsight.
Decisive or Distracted: The Effects of US Constraint on Security Networks
Ha Eun Choi et al.
British Journal of Political Science, November 2025
Abstract:
The rise of China as a global power has been a prominent feature in international politics. Simultaneously, the United States has been engaged in ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia for the past two decades, requiring a significant commitment of resources, focus, and determination. This paper investigates how third-party countries react to the United States’ preoccupation with these conflicts, particularly in terms of diplomatic co-operation and alignment. We introduce a measure of US distraction and utilize network-based indicators to assess diplomatic co-operation or alignment. Our study tests the hypothesis that when the US is distracted, other states are more likely to co-operate with its principal rival, China. Our findings support this hypothesis, revealing that increased co-operation with China is more probable during periods of US distraction. However, a closer examination of state responses shows that democracies distance themselves from China under these circumstances, while non-democracies move closer.
Implosion Nuclear Weapons with 60%-Enriched Uranium
Matt Caplan
Science & Global Security, forthcoming
Abstract:
This work considers the direct use of 60%-enriched uranium in pure fission nuclear weapons. From numerical simulations and simple analytics this work shows that substituting a weapons-grade core for a 60%-enriched core reduces the yield by a factor of 4 to 5 that is fairly insensitive to classified design details. A weapon designed to achieve a nominal 10 kt yield using weapons-grade uranium could therefore still produce a modest yield of 2–3 kt using a core of lower enrichment.
Did 3G Make Afghan Insurgents Fight More Effectively? A Disaggregated Study
Mehmet Erdem Arslan
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Studies on the impacts of communication technologies on civil conflict often focus on the presence of cell phone networks and draw mixed conclusions. Meanwhile, communication technologies have been advancing and the nature of telecommunication has changed. I argue that the richness of information exchange marked by the introduction of 3G mobile technologies provides an opportunity to push the debate forward, by leading to an increase in the violence of insurgent groups in a high-intensity episode. I focus on Afghanistan as a tough test for my argument. Analysing the effect of introducing 3G network in existing 2G network areas using matched wake analysis and spatial models, I find that the introduction of 3G is associated with an increase in the number of violent events, IED attacks, and coordinated multiple attacks perpetrated by Afghan insurgents. The results are robust to different sizes of spatial units, placebo tests, and less likely to suffer from reporting bias.
Older and Wiser: How Terrorist Leaders’ Tenure Influences Tactical Decisions
Michael Logan et al.
Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming
Abstract:
Terrorist leaders play a central role in overseeing and executing strategic and operational decisions to advance their group’s political goals. One key decision includes what targets should be attacked and how often. While previous research has identified various factors influencing target selection, little attention has been given to how individual-level characteristics shape terrorist leaders’ tactical choices. This study examines how a leader’s tenure and role in founding a group affect the nature and balance of targets attacked in group operations. Using a global sample of 120 terrorist leaders across 77 groups, longitudinal multi-level models reveal that as a leader’s tenure increases, so does their group’s attack frequency on both soft and hard targets. Contrary to expectations, groups led by more experienced leaders devote a greater proportion of their attacks to soft targets. Additionally, groups led by founding leaders attack hard targets at significantly lower rates than those led by non-founders. These findings, consistent with organizational science theories, suggest that terrorist organizations may exhibit strategic leadership dynamics similar to those in traditional firms.
The Bombing of Hospitals and Rebel Responses in Civil War. Evidence from Syria
Regine Schwab, Werner Krause & Samer Massoud
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does targeting civilians suppress or intensify insurgent violence? Existing research presents contradictory findings, focusing primarily on direct civilian targeting. We examine how government attacks on civilian infrastructure – specifically medical facilities – affect rebel behavior. We argue that hospital bombings trigger rebel escalation through civilian pressure and reputation-seeking. Analyzing novel data on hospital attacks in northwestern Syria (2017-2020), we use matching methods combined with difference-in-differences estimation to assess effects on combat intensity. Distinguishing between rebel- and government-initiated fighting, we find that hospital attacks increase insurgent violence within one week. Interviews with medical workers, activists, and rebels confirm that hospital bombings intensify attacks through our hypothesized mechanisms. These findings demonstrate that infrastructure targeting backfires strategically, echoing broader evidence on punishment strategies’ limitations in counterinsurgency. Our results also highlight concerns about the erosion of legal norms protecting medical facilities and civilians in armed conflict.