Politics as Usual
Power increases dehumanization
Joris Lammers & Diederik Stapel
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, January 2011, Pages 113-126
Abstract:
The current paper shows that the experience or possession of power increases dehumanization - the process of denying essential elements of "humanness" in other people and perceiving them as objects or animals. A position of power entails making difficult decisions for other people that may cause pain and suffering. Dehumanization helps to downplay this pain and suffering and thus to justify these decisions. Study 1 shows that powerful people dehumanize an outgroup more. Study 2 replicates that powerful people dehumanize an outgroup more and shows that this is especially likely after making a tough decision that is painful for that outgroup. Study 3 replicates this in a medical context. Together, these studies show that dehumanization - although by itself a very negative phenomenon - can also have functional elements: it helps powerful people to make tough decisions in a more distant, cold, and rational manner.
----------------------
Kenji Noguchi, Ian Handley & Dolores Albarracín
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
A series of studies examined whether political participation can emerge from general patterns of indiscriminate activity. In the first two studies, general action tendencies were measured by combining national and state-level indicators of high activity (e.g., impulsiveness, pace of life, and physical activity) from international and U.S. data. This action-tendency index positively correlated with a measure of political participation that consisted of voting behaviors and participation in political demonstrations. The following two experimental studies indicated that participants exposed to action words (e.g., go, move) had stronger intentions to vote in an upcoming election and volunteered more time to make phone calls on behalf of a university policy than participants exposed to inaction words did (e.g., relax, stop). These studies suggest that political participation can be predicted from general tendencies toward activity present at the national and state levels, as well as from verbal prompts suggestive of activity.
----------------------
Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment
Alan Gerber, Gregory Huber & Ebonya Washington
American Political Science Review, November 2010, Pages 720-744
Abstract:
Partisanship is strongly correlated with attitudes and behavior, but it is unclear from this pattern whether partisan identity has a causal effect on political behavior and attitudes. We report the results of a field experiment that investigates the causal effect of party identification. Prior to the February 2008 Connecticut presidential primary, researchers sent a mailing to a random sample of unaffiliated registered voters who, in a pretreatment survey, leaned toward a political party. The mailing informed the subjects that only voters registered with a party were able to participate in the upcoming presidential primary. Subjects were surveyed again in June 2008. Comparing posttreatment survey responses to subjects' baseline survey responses, we find that those reminded of the need to register with a party were more likely to identify with a party and showed stronger partisanship. Further, we find that the treatment group also demonstrated greater concordance than the control group between their pretreatment latent partisanship and their posttreatment reported voting behavior and intentions and evaluations of partisan figures. Thus, our treatment, which appears to have caused a strengthening of partisan identity, also appears to have caused a shift in subjects' candidate preferences and evaluations of salient political figures. This finding is consistent with the claim that partisanship is an active force changing how citizens behave in and perceive the political world.
----------------------
Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits
Andrea Prat, Riccardo Puglisi & James Snyder
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, December 2010, Pages 291-318
Abstract:
What would happen if the current U.S. campaign finance system, mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding scheme of the same magnitude? Some argue that public funding would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true if private donations are somehow targeted to "better" candidates. In this paper, we ask what voters can learn about the "effectiveness" of a legislator from the amount and pattern of contributions received during the campaign. We find that the total amount that a candidate receives is a positive, but weak, predictor of that candidate's effectiveness. Small contributions provide a strong and positive signal of effectiveness, while large contributions are a negative signal of effectiveness. Contributions from organizations also provide a positive signal, while contributions from individuals, parties, and candidates themselves do not.
----------------------
Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress
Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi
Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator. This pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician (thereby increasing contributions), but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds (thereby decreasing contributions). The model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and PAC donations and local employment by sector. This procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes: we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145 dollars.
----------------------
Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? A New Perspective, with Evidence from the U.S. Senate
David Albouy
Electoral Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using quasi-experimental evidence from close elections, Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) - henceforth LMB - argue competition for voters in U.S. House elections does not affect policy positions, as incumbent Senate candidates do not vote more extremely if elected than non-incumbents. Despite stronger electoral competition and greater legislative independence, similar results, shown here, hold for the Senate. Yet, the hypothesis that voters do not affect policies conflicts with how Senators moderate their positions prior to their next election. LMB-style estimates appear to be biased downwards as junior members of Congress prefer to vote more extremely than senior members, independently of their electoral strength. Corrected estimates are more favorable to the hypothesis that candidates moderate their policy choices in response to electoral competition.
----------------------
The Power and Limitations of Commissions: The Iraq Study Group, Bush, Obama, and Congress
Jordan Tama
Presidential Studies Quarterly, March 2011, Pages 135-155
Abstract:
This article uses a case study of the 2006 Iraq Study Group to illustrate the policy-making power and limitations of blue-ribbon commissions. I argue that the distinct political credibility of commissions can enable them to shape public opinion and drive policy change, but that commissions usually cannot bridge partisan divides on highly salient issues marked by intense polarization. The case study reveals that the Iraq Study Group influenced public views of George W. Bush's Iraq policy, placed significant pressure on Bush to change his Iraq strategy, and shaped the Iraq plan of Barack Obama - even though the commission was unable to forge agreement between Bush and Democratic congressional leaders.
----------------------
The Citizens United Election? Or Same As It Ever Was?
Michael Franz
The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics, December 2010
Abstract:
In January 2010, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC overturned long-standing regulations governing the role of unions and corporations in sponsoring pro-candidate advocacy. Many predicted a deleterious effect on the electoral process. In the aftermath of the midterm elections, a number of questions deserve consideration. Was the observed level of outside spending abnormally high in 2010? What can we say about the potential effect of outside spending on the outcomes of House and Senate races? Moreover, what has the decision done to the power of parties and, most especially, their ability to compete with special interests in backing federal candidates? This paper investigates these questions using data from the Wesleyan Media Project, which tracked political ads in 2010. The initial evidence suggests that while interest groups were aggressive players in the air war, their impact may not have been as negative or as large as initially predicted.
----------------------
Who Wants Electoral Competition and Who Wants to Win?
Thomas Brunell & Harold Clarke
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article employs data gathered in a 2006 national survey to study how the American electorate evaluates a trade-off between competitive elections and winning to implement preferred policies. The results show that voters do not share in the prevailing elite consensus about the overriding virtues of competition. A multilevel model indicates that ideological extremism, partisanship, social trust, and several other individual-level variables have predictable relationships with preferences for winning or competition. In addition, electoral margin in the 2006 congressional district election interacts with support for winning or losing candidates. Voters supporting candidates who are soundly defeated take refuge in competition, whereas those supporting candidates who win decisively view victory as a means of implementing policy preferences. Additional analyses show that preferences for winning and competition influence various forms of political participation. By emphasizing public involvement in policy making, voters expressing a preference to win echo "responsible party government" critiques of the democratic shortcomings of the American political system.
----------------------
The Dilemma of Direct Democracy
Craig Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew McCubbins
Election Law Journal, December 2010, Pages 305-324
Abstract:
The dilemma of direct democracy is that voters may not always be able to make welfare-improving decisions. Arthur Lupia's seminal work has led us to believe that voters can substitute voting cues for substantive policy knowledge. Lupia, however, emphasized that cues were valuable under certain conditions and not others. In what follows, we present three main findings regarding voters and what they know about California's Proposition 7. First, much like Lupia reported, we show voters who are able to recall endorsements for or against a ballot measure vote similarly to people who recall certain basic facts about the initiative. We show, second, that voters whose stated policy preferences would otherwise suggest they would favor the "no" position cast their ballots with far less error than do people who favor the "yes" position. This suggests that many voters may employ a "defensive no" strategy when faced with complex policy choices on the ballot. Our third result is a bit surprising: we find that better-informed voters, whether this information is derived from factual knowledge of the initiative or from knowledge of well-publicized voting cues, are no more likely to make reasoned decisions than those who are, by our measure, uninformed. This suggests that existing theories of voter choice, especially in direct democracy, may be inadequate. We conclude with some preliminary policy recommendations that could help improve the information environment for initiatives and referenda by providing key information on the ballot.
----------------------
Sean Lux, Russell Crook & David Woehr
Journal of Management, January 2011, Pages 223-247
Abstract:
Corporate political activity (CPA) has increased rapidly in the United States; however, research findings are spread across several social science fields. The authors use meta-analysis to aggregate findings involving two sets of research questions: (1) what factors and to what extent do these factors influence firms to engage in CPA, and (2) does CPA, in turn, affect firm performance and, if so, to what extent? Two important contributions are made. First, the evidence suggests that, although many factors shape CPA, very few affect CPA to a large extent. Second, the results suggest that CPA is positively related to firm performance and is an important determinant of firm performance. The authors build on this evidence to suggest several future research directions.
----------------------
Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis
Kaisa Kotakorpi & Panu Poutvaara
Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
A growing theoretical literature on the effect of politicians' salaries on the average level of skills of political candidates yields ambiguous predictions. In this paper, we estimate the effect of pay for politicians on the level of education of parliamentary candidates. We take advantage of an exceptional reform where the salaries of Finnish MPs were increased by 35 % in the year 2000, intended to make the pay for parliamentarians more competitive. A difference-in-differences analysis, using candidates in municipal elections as a control group, suggests that the higher salary increased the fraction of candidates with higher education among female candidates, while we find no significant effect for male candidates.
----------------------
Indian Nations as Interest Groups: Tribal Motivations for Contributions to U.S. Senators
Frederick Boehmke & Richard Witmer
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The expansion of Indian gaming has produced significant financial gains for Indian nations across the United States. In response to this influx of revenue, tribes have expanded their political activity, particularly in those areas that are heavily resource dependent. In this article the authors argue that adopting an organized interests perspective enhances scholars' understanding of tribal political activity. To demonstrate this, they study Indian gaming contributions received by senators from 1990 to 2004. The authors apply broadly utilized theories of contribution patterns based on the value of access for a group and the cost of access to a member, focusing on ideology, access, electoral security, and constituency characteristics. The results indicate that tribes respond to all of these factors in ways similar to more traditional organized interests.