Politically Linked
Why more social interactions lead to more polarization in societies
Stefan Thurner, Markus Hofer & Jan Korbel
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 4 November 2025
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, the number of close social connections increased substantially, at least by a factor of two. At the same time, societal opinions have become increasingly polarized in many Western countries. To explore whether these trends could be connected, we employ a simple computational model of society, where people -- within their social networks -- continuously compare and update their opinions. Here, we show that the model that is known to realistically capture both homophily and social balance exhibits a phase transition phenomenon where, above a critical social connectivity, an explosive transition toward strong polarization must occur. The model allows us to understand the empirical inflation of polarization during the last decades as a function of the observed increased values of social connectivity. In the presence of a small fraction of synchronized influencers, the transition becomes continuous; however, polarization then appears at lower connectivities. We discuss the implications of the presence of a phase transition in social polarization.
Partisan or Principled? Explaining Political Differences in Attitudes About Violations of Democratic Norms
Paul Teas
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although both Democrats and Republicans tend to be more tolerant of democratic norm violations that benefit their own party, this pattern is not always symmetrical, even when political stakes appear identical. Two experiments (N = 2,352) tested competing explanations: that partisans differ in democratic commitment, their tendency to rationalize violations as legitimate, or the values they prioritize (e.g., voter access vs. election integrity). Both parties rationalized weaker opposition to beneficial violations as more democratic. However, Republicans in Study 1 were more responsive to partisan advantage without showing similarly greater democratic rationalization and more tolerant of mail-in voting restrictions regardless of partisan benefit. These differences disappeared in Study 2 when different violations were tested, suggesting such asymmetries are issue-specific rather than fixed. Overall, the findings suggest that partisan gaps in support for democratic norm violations reflect the politicization of particular practices more than stable differences in commitment to democracy.
Indifferent or impartial? Actor–observer asymmetries in expressing and evaluating sociopolitical neutrality
Rachel Ruttan, Gabrielle Adams & Katherine DeCelles
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, November 2025, Pages 3233-3249
Abstract:
Opposing someone on a contentious sociopolitical issue often prompts criticism and conflict. People may be tempted to reduce such acrimony by expressing neutrality. Across 11 studies with North American samples, we find that, although people commonly express neutrality on controversial issues, observers are skeptical of others’ neutrality, judging them as similarly moral as those who explicitly oppose them. Unpacking lay beliefs about why people express neutrality sheds light on this disjunction between responses to the neutral self versus the neutral other. Specifically, people render more favorable attributions for their own neutrality (e.g., true indecision) than do observers (e.g., apathy, strategic behavior). Therefore, while neutrality is an often-invoked strategy to manage impressions, it is unlikely to succeed in doing so.
Political Heterogeneity and Societal Polarization Impair Individual Performance: Evidence from Random Assignment in Professional Golf
Tim Sels & Balázs Kovács
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine how political heterogeneity in groups affects individual performance in settings where people work alongside others. Leveraging the random assignment of golfers to groups in Professional Golfers’ Association Tour tournaments, we find that golfers score 0.2 strokes better per round when playing in politically homogeneous versus heterogeneous groups. This corresponds to a five-rank improvement before the tournament cut and an additional $13,000–$23,400 in tournament earnings. The effect intensifies during periods of high societal political polarization and diminishes when polarization is low. We propose that politically heterogeneous groups create a more stressful and less psychologically safe environment, reducing focus and leading to reduced performance. Consistent with this mechanism, analyses of shot-level data reveal that this effect is strongest during driving and putting shots when players are in close physical proximity. Our study contributes to the understanding of how political heterogeneity in groups affects individual performance in competitive settings, with implications for managing ideological differences in organizations.
The Control Motivation Function of Populist Attitudes: Causal Evidence that Populist Reasoning Raises Perceptions of Control
Annedore Hoppe, Immo Fritsche & Helena Pauen
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present studies investigate how populist attitudes influence perceptions of personal control. Populist reasoning is proposed to enhance personal control by promoting a sense of belonging to an agentic group (“the people”) that opposes a perceived antagonistic “corrupt elite.” Across three experiments (N = 733), participants were asked to adopt either a populist or a pluralistic reasoning style. In Study 3, the salience of high versus low personal control was additionally manipulated. Results showed that populist reasoning increased participants’ sense of control, particularly in relation to specific goals, such as performing well in an upcoming debate. However, making low control salient tended to diminish this effect. These findings suggest that populist narratives may be appealing during crises due to their control-enhancing function. The novel experimental method for manipulating populist attitudes opens new pathways for testing causal effects and understanding the motivational drivers of populism, potentially contributing to future interventions in this field.
Susceptibility to Moral Arguments Among Liberals and Conservatives
Fredrik Jansson & Pontus Strimling
Public Opinion Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
An empirical result in Moral Foundations Theory is that liberals and progressives endorse the individualizing factors of care and fairness, while conservatives claim that the binding factors of authority, loyalty, and purity are equally relevant when determining what is moral. Does this translate into persuasiveness of arguments and opinion change? We here test the hypothesis that conservatives can be swayed by binding moral arguments, while everyone is susceptible to individualizing moral arguments. Using a classic experimental design (N = 375) where respondents are given moral arguments for a position in nine moral issues, we find support for this hypothesis. In line with motivational matching, the moral foundation support of respondents predicts the type of arguments to which they are susceptible. Along with previous studies on which type of moral argument supports which moral position in the public debate, these findings provide a mechanistic explanation for public opinion change, and in particular for the observation that moral values are becoming more liberal and progressive across the board. Although people tend to be resistant to belief revision, their opinions on politically polarized issues can change when arguments match their beliefs, reflected in their ideology.
The Business of the Culture War
Shakked Noy & Aakaash Rao
Harvard Working Paper, November 2025
Abstract:
We link the contemporary American “culture war” to changes in media technologies in the 1980s and to the cable news networks which responded to the new incentives of the era. We first show that cable news emphasizes culture-war issues much more, and economic issues much less, than older broadcast news or politicians. Using household-by-second smart TV data, we trace cable news’ emphasis on cultural over economic issues to a distinctive business strategy: culture attracts viewers who would otherwise not watch news (“mobilization”); economics attracts viewers who would otherwise watch competing news outlets (“poaching”); and the number mobilized by culture is greater than the number poached by economics, so culture increases viewership. We highlight the parallel to politicians -- who also trade off “mobilizing” nonvoters against “poaching” competitors’ voters -- but show why mobilization-focused strategies are disadvantaged in politics: cable outlets maximize audience size and so value poaching and mobilization equally, but politicians maximize vote share and so value poaching twice as much as mobilization. Cable news’ incentive to center mobilizing culture war content influences politics: constituencies more exposed to cable news assign greater importance to cultural issues, and politicians respond by supplying more cultural ads. Our estimates suggest that cable news can account for one-third of the time-series increase in cultural conflict since 2000.
Polarized Consumption
Ali Umut Guler & Vishal Singh
NYU Working Paper, October 2025
Abstract:
Using two decades of household purchase records (2004-2023) and retail scanner data, this paper documents political polarization in everyday consumption. We examine products marketed with health or environmental claims -- such as organic produce, cage-free eggs, and natural personal care items -- across ten packaged-goods categories. Progressive households increasingly purchase these products relative to conservative households, with the gap growing from 1 percentage point in 2004 to 8.3 percentage points by 2023. The divergence emerges in 2007 and accelerates after 2016. We also document supply-side divergence: retailers in Democratic counties carry substantially more of these products. However, controlling for local availability and prices leaves consumption differences virtually unchanged, suggesting that preference differences rather than differential access drive the observed patterns. We also provide evidence that the ideology-consumption divergence often intensifies during periods of heightened public discourse about health and environmental issues. Our findings indicate that partisan divides extend beyond policy disagreements into routine, low-involvement purchases.
Why do some people refuse to compromise their positions on politicized practices? The role of need for closure
Namrata Goyal, Krishna Savani & Michael Morris
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, November 2025
Abstract:
People's stances on politicized practices, such as abortion and gun ownership, are increasingly resistant to compromise, making dialogue between opposing sides difficult. Why are some people more prone to refusing to compromise on their stances on politicized practices than others? Five studies (N = 1377) found that high need for closure (NFC) is an antecedent of refusal to compromise. Study 1 found that people scoring higher on dispositional NFC were unwilling to compromise on their stances on gun ownership, hunting, marijuana consumption, and euthanasia, even after controlling for the extremity, importance, intensity, and centrality of each of these attitudes. Study 2 focused on abortion, a practice that is highly politicized in the US. Under time pressure, which reliably heightens NFC, both pro-life and pro-choice participants became more unwilling to compromise on their respective positions on abortion. Study 3 found that the relationship between NFC and refusal to compromise on one's position on several politicized practices was stronger among individuals who prioritized binding moral foundations (which emphasize group cohesion) rather than individualizing moral foundations (which emphasize personal autonomy). Studies 4–5 examined the underlying mechanism using the experimental causal chain method. Time pressure, which reliably heightens NFC, increased people's tendency to use deontological reasoning, a cognitive style that emphasizes rule-based over outcome-based judgments (Study 4), and inducing deontological reasoning heightened resistance to compromising one's positions on several politicized practices (Study 5). Together, these studies uncover a potential psychological mechanism behind political polarization, a highly divisive phenomenon, and identify pathways that could inform efforts to reduce intergroup conflict.
Normativity is not a replacement for theory
Ashley Rubin
Theory and Society, October 2025, Pages 795-850
Abstract:
Social science research has dramatically increased its embrace of normativity in substance and style. This paper explores the consequences of this normativity creep on the creation, application, and evaluation of theory in academic research. Using interdisciplinary punishment studies as my case, I argue that normativity is taking the place of theory: it is replacing theory and, in its importance, overtaking theory, blunting our understanding of important phenomena. Scholars are using normative pronouncements in place of theory because, for many scholars, the goals and rules of social science research have changed. The rise of new goals and rules of research represents a shift in the logic of research from a primarily science-based logic to a primarily activist-based logic. I close by discussing some of the real-world stakes of the science–activism tension affecting not only theory development but academia more generally.