Might and Right
The Rules-Based International Order: A Historical Analysis
Marc Trachtenberg
International Security, Fall 2025, Pages 7-54
Abstract:
There has been a good deal of talk in recent years about the “rules-based international order” — the system of laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that, many observers say, lay at the heart of the international system that came into being after World War II. It is often argued that maintaining the rules-based order — and extending it if possible — should be a fundamental goal not just for the United States but for Western countries more generally. Those liberal internationalist arguments are supported by a number of historical claims: about how the rules-based order came into being and about the role played by key institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Bretton Woods monetary system. Those claims are examined here. The basic finding is that many common arguments in this area are not supported by the historical evidence. That finding serves as a kind of springboard for thinking about whether there are any viable alternatives to the sort of policy the liberal internationalists have called for. The argument here is that there are viable alternatives -- alternatives based on certain traditional ideas about how foreign policy should be conducted.
Interstate Conflict Increases the Appeal of Undemocratic Candidates
Kristian Frederiksen & Lasse Laustsen
British Journal of Political Science, October 2025
Abstract:
How do threats of interstate conflict affect American voters’ propensity to support candidates who violate democratic principles? We argue that undemocratic behavior affects perceived dominance, which citizens value in times of conflict. We fielded two conjoint experiments and a factorial vignette experiment in the United States to test this two-step argument. First, our conjoint experiments demonstrate a robust and strong relationship between undemocratic candidate behavior and dominance impressions. Second, our vignette experiment -- manipulating undemocratic behavior by in-party presidential candidates and priming threats of conflict with China and Russia -- shows that undemocratic candidates are evaluated more positively under conflict compared to peace. This is especially the case among Republican voters, although the pattern is also evident among Democrats and Independents. Our letter sheds light on the consequences of the escalation of wars with relevance to the United States around the globe, pointing to toleration of undemocratic behavior specifically.
Judgements of Propaganda Near and Far: National Identity and Media Evaluations
Rebecca Dunk, Ronda Lo & Raymond Mar
European Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Western media often critiques foreign governments for their propaganda efforts while ignoring similar efforts by their own government. We predicted that individuals would demonstrate a similar bias. An experiment with 282 Canadian participants revealed just the opposite: when asked overtly, participants judged a video attributed to their own government to be more like propaganda than identical foreign media. When asked covertly (e.g., about the video's bias), we observed no effect, and national identity was not a moderator for Canadians. In a direct replication, Americans (N = 457) also judged domestic videos as more like propaganda than foreign ones, whether perceptions of propaganda were measured overtly or covertly. This difference was especially true of those lower and average in national identity, compared to those higher. A follow-up study demonstrated that Americans (N = 380) who are left-leaning are more likely to show this bias against domestic media, compared to those who are centrist or right-leaning. These studies demonstrate that people can be more critical of their own government's messaging relative to the same messaging by a foreign power, the opposite of holding a self-serving double standard.
Do People Listen to Cassandra? Persuasion and Accuracy in Geopolitical Forecasts
Yhonatan Shemesh et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
In a world marked by persistent uncertainty, accurately predicting the future is vital. While certain people (“superforecasters”) and practices (aggregation) can produce more accurate forecasts, the utility of these forecasts depends on whether they are persuasive enough to be heeded. This study investigates the relationship between persuasion and accuracy in geopolitical forecasts. In a forecasting competition, 153 forecasters predicted future global events and explained their rationales. Next, 474 evaluators rated these rationales for persuasiveness. Using a neural network–based language model, we found that although forecasting rationales contained valid cues for accuracy, evaluators were no more persuaded by accurate forecasts. Further analyses using large language models revealed that psychological attributes indicating expertise, trustworthiness, and emotional composure were associated with both persuasion and accuracy, while eloquence and confidence, though persuasive, were unrelated to accuracy. We conclude that people are sensitive to valid cues, but are misled by invalid ones, impairing overall calibration.
Territorial Integrity as an Etiquette of Thieves: Non-conquest in Nineteenth-Century Imperialism
Kerry Goettlich
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
In the contemporary era, territorial conquest has been seen as illegitimate and has taken place in only limited ways. According to an influential narrative in scholarship and public debate, this “territorial integrity norm” is a product of the post-World War II international order and contrasts with the nineteenth century, when conquest was normalized and “might made right.” This essay argues, however, that nineteenth-century European international law imposed meaningful limitations on conquest, including “territorial inviolability.” These limitations were more effective in the colonized world than in Europe, primarily because national irredentism was not thought relevant outside Europe. Europeans’ denial of non-European sovereignty contrasted with their respect for European-established colonial boundaries, and they did not fight over colonial territory between 1815 and 1914. I demonstrate the strength of this “etiquette of thieves” by examining two events where territorial conflict between colonial powers was narrowly avoided: the Panjdeh (1885) and Fashoda (1898) incidents. Viewing territorial integrity as qualitatively changing, rather than absent at one time and present later, has important implications for discussions of how recent conquests, such as those of Russia in Ukraine, will affect the principle of territorial integrity. In particular, territorial integrity may be more likely to be altered in how it is applied than eroded altogether. A specific form of territorial integrity is an integral part of the post-World War II international order, but constraints on conquest as such need not be limited to that specific version of territorial integrity.
Dictatorships and Western Public Relations Firms: Evidence from the United States
Adam Scharpf, Christian Gläßel & Alexander Dukalskis
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why and when do dictatorships use Western public relations (PR) firms? About 80% of post-World War II dictatorships have enlisted US-based PR specialists. The emerging literature has provided no systematic insight into the role of foreign helpers in authoritarian image management. We argue that authoritarian regimes can hire Western PR professionals to counter criticism, amplify positive publicity, stabilize foreign support, or signal their allegiance. Our macro-quantitative analysis of thousands of contracts between authoritarian regimes and US-based PR firms (1945–2022) offers strong support for two of the logics and partial support for the others. We supplement these findings with evidence from five short case studies. Our findings are crucial for understanding how authoritarian regimes wield soft power and influence foreign public discourse and decision-making.
Conventional Deterrence of Nuclear Use
Adam Mount
International Security, Fall 2025, Pages 95-129
Abstract:
Some academic literature and U.S. policy documents suggest that conventional deterrence is weaker than nuclear deterrence. But recent developments in U.S. policy suggest that conventional forces are assuming a larger role in deterring limited nuclear use. This article explores why and how U.S. officials may turn to conventional weapons to deter a nuclear attack. As conventional weapons are becoming increasingly capable of producing strategic effects in response to a nuclear attack, U.S. officials may be more likely to consider conventional deterrence as a credible option to deter those attacks. In some cases, U.S. officials are likely to prefer conventional options to avoid the costs, risks, and uncertainty of nuclear threats. To test the theory, the article presents the results of a series of individual, scenario-based “tabletop interviews” with former senior U.S. officials who might plausibly have been consulted on a decision about how to deter a North Korean nuclear attack. The results demonstrate that U.S. officials increasingly consider conventional deterrence of nuclear use to be a viable and valuable capability.
The Civic-Minded Citizen and the Role of Conscription: Evidence from Sweden
Daniel Almén
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Motivated by the revival of conscription and the enduring belief that it is a highly influential institution in fostering civic virtues and engagement, this paper estimates the causal effects of peacetime selective conscription on civic engagement. Using a quasi-experimental design and third-party-reported Swedish administrative data, the study examines three behavioral indicators of civic engagement: blood donation, voter turnout, and payments to the public broadcasting service. While descriptive results show strong positive associations between military service and all outcomes, the causal estimates are small and statistically insignificant. The results challenge the notion that conscription inherently and substantially fosters civic-mindedness. Thus, alternative policies may be more effective in promoting civic engagement. While the results are primarily generalizable to Western, non-Latin countries, the paper also discusses key aspects of institutional design that may influence whether and how conscription promotes civic engagement.
To Agree or Not to Agree: Hawks, Doves, and Regime Type in International Rivalry and Rapprochement
Michael Goldfien
International Security, Fall 2025, Pages 162-192
Abstract:
Existing scholarship emphasizes hawks’ advantages in making peace, but it is squarely focused on electorally accountable leaders, even though most international rivalries feature at least one leader who faces no meaningful electoral check. I argue that electoral accountability moderates the relationship between foreign policy preferences and rapprochement. In low electoral accountability autocracies where citizens struggle to punish leaders, the credibility problem that doves face in selling peace at home becomes less important than their motivation to cooperate internationally. As a result, doves, not hawks, should be more successful peacemakers in autocracies. I test the theory by analyzing two prominent cases of rapprochement: the end of the Cold War under Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s; and the end of the Egypt-Israel rivalry in the late 1970s under Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat.
Public Preferences for Reallocating Aid in the Presence of Alternative Donors
Matthew Winters et al.
Political Research Quarterly, December 2025, Pages 1379-1393
Abstract:
Research has shown that people support foreign aid more when reminded of its strategic uses or when cued to think about international competition. Additional strategic considerations might affect evaluations of foreign aid. We examine whether citizens in aid-giving countries distinguish across different types of substituting donors, explore whether attitudes regarding aid are underpinned by countries’ relative power positions, and investigate citizens’ support for reallocating aid from one set of recipient countries to another. We test the impact of these strategic considerations using parallel online survey experiments conducted on representative samples from Japan and the United States. In Japan, we find that reference to either an adversary or an ally as a substitute donor reduces support for aid reallocation. Mediation analysis confirms that respondents’ attitudes are driven by national interest considerations. In the United States, respondents perceive that aid substitution by an adversary -- but not an ally -- will negatively impact national interests, but these concerns are not sufficient to change opinions regarding aid reallocation. We attribute these findings to donor publics’ different understandings of their country’s relative position in the international system and the differing roles of foreign aid in pursuing national objectives.