Legislative Oversight
Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress
Joseph Bafumi & Michael Herron
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We consider the relationship between the preferences of American voters and the preferences of the U.S. legislators who represent them. Using an Internet-based, national opinion survey in conjunction with legislator voting records from the 109th and 110th Congresses, we show that members of Congress are more extreme than their constituents, i.e., that there is a lack of congruence between American voters and members of Congress. We also show that when a congressional legislator is replaced by a new member of the opposite party, one relative extremist is replaced by an opposing extremist. We call this leapfrog representation, a form of representation that leaves moderates with a dearth of representation in Congress. We see evidence of leapfrog representation in states and House districts and in the aggregate as well: the median member of the 109th House was too conservative compared to the median American voter, yet the median of the 110th House was too liberal. Thus, the median American voter was leapfrogged when the 109th House transitioned to the 110th. Although turnover between the 109th and 110th Senates occurred at approximately the same rate as between the 109th and 110th Houses, the Senate appears to be a more moderate institution whose median member does not move as abruptly as that of the House.
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Political Distrust and Conservative Voting in Ballot Measure Elections
Joshua Dyck
Political Research Quarterly, September 2010, Pages 612-626
Abstract:
Over the past thirty years, the cumulative effects of direct democracy have served to decrease both levels of taxation and spending in the American states. Yet conservative budgetary policy measures passed during this time period were likely to occur in liberal states. Using data on over thirty separate ballot issues, the author offers a solution to this puzzle, demonstrating that distrusting government serves as a consistently robust predictor of conservative policy choice. The implication of this finding is that citizens often choose conservative policy outcomes because they believe that government is functionally incapable of giving them what they want.
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The Price of Pork: The Seniority Trap in the U.S. House
Jason DeBacker
Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using data on federal outlays and U.S. House elections, I estimate the effect of the pork barrel on the quality of officeholders, taking into account the fact that seniority creates a dynamic linkage across periods. After estimating the parameters governing the influence of seniority on federal outlays and the parameters governing the distributions of candidate quality, I conduct several policy experiments to uncover the size of the welfare loss created by the seniority system. I find that the seniority system negatively impacts the quality of representatives, but has little effect on the outcomes of elections. Furthermore, the most commonly proposed solution to the distortion, term limits, may have a significant, negative effect on the quality of sitting representatives. Instead of a quantity constraint (term limits), I propose a change in the relative price of seniority by way of a Pigouvian tax on seniority. Such a policy achieves the first-best outcome.
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Jordan Michael Ragusa
American Politics Research, November 2010, Pages 1015-1051
Abstract:
The first stage in the policy lifecycle - creation - has garnered significant attention while the final stage - repeal - has received scarcely any. To reconcile this imbalance, an extensive data set recording repeals to landmark laws enacted from 1951 to 2006 was complied. Event history analysis yields three significant results. First, the incidence of repeal exhibits a regular pattern characterized by an increasing hazard immediately after enactment followed by institutionalization and a monotonically declining hazard. Second, divided government has a complementary effect on the policy process, simultaneously constraining lawmakers from reversing enacted policies while effecting more durable legislation over the long term. Thus, the negative effects of divided government on policy production are offset by a decrease in policy repeal. Third, polarization has a curvilinear effect on the risk of repeal. Moderate polarization facilitates coalition formation when enacting repeals while polarized and depolarized periods have an attenuating effect.
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The Dynamics of Agenda Convergence and the Paradox of Competitiveness in Presidential Campaigns
Danny Hayes
Political Research Quarterly, September 2010, Pages 594-611
Abstract:
The mass media's representation of campaign discourse influences whether voters have the opportunity to scrutinize the candidates' issue priorities and policy proposals. But it is not clear whether candidate and media issue emphases are more or less similar at an election's most consequential moments - when it is competitive. In a study of the 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns, the author finds that as the polls narrow, the media are less likely to reflect candidate discourse. Paradoxically, voters are deprived of an accurate representation of candidate dialogue when they need it most, with media behavior making it difficult for citizens to cast informed ballots in close contests. The results also show that whether the media serve as a conduit for, or filter of, candidate messages depends on a variety of factors, especially electoral context.
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Political Polarization and the Size of Government
Erik Lindqvist & Robert Ostling
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this article, we study the relationship between political polarization and public spending using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. Political polarization is strongly associated with smaller government in democratic countries, but there is no relationship between polarization and the size of government in undemocratic countries. The results are robust to a large set of control variables, including gross domestic product per capita and income inequality.
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Nathalie Giger & Moira Nelson
European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article challenges the dominant assumptions in the literature that cutting social policy incurs voter wrath and that political parties can efficiently internalise electoral fallout with blame avoidance strategies. Drawing on the diverse literature on the role of partisanship in the period of permanent austerity, several partisan hypotheses on the relationship between social policy change and electoral outcomes are posited. The results indicate that religious and liberal parties gain votes, and thereby are able to 'claim credit', for retrenching social policy. None of the other coefficients for the effect of social policy cuts reach significance, raising the question of whether parties excel at blame avoidance or the public fails to place blame in the first place.
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Black Radical Voices and Policy Effectiveness in the U.S. Congress
Katherine Tate
The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics, July 2010
Abstract:
This paper argues that African-American House legislators have become less radical, engaging in less forceful ideological battles with the Democratic Party over its policy leadership. They have become simultaneously more prone to support policy leadership from Democratic presidents as well. This argument is based on a study of floor votes by black legislators on budget resolutions in the Carter and Clinton administrations, as well as an analysis of presidential support and party unity scores from 1977 to 2008 in CQ Almanacs. Since the 1990s, based on a number of factors, black House members are less likely to challenge Democratic presidential and party leadership as radical voices on the political left. This decline in black radicalism, I contend, has implications for the concept of African-American politics as an organized challenge to the racial status of blacks.
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How Citizens and Their Legislators Prioritize Spheres of Representation
John Griffin & Patrick Flavin
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The authors uncover evidence that citizens' priorities about various spheres of legislative representation differ across demographic groups and that these differences are subsequently reflected in the in-office behavior of their elected officials. Specifically, African Americans and Latinos are less concerned than whites with policy representation - the attentiveness of elected officials to citizens' policy preferences - but place more emphasis on their district receiving its fair share of federal money. Citizens with higher incomes place a higher priority on policy representation and less on constituency service than do those with lower incomes. Importantly, these priorities map onto their member of Congress's behavior.
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Evaluations Of Congress And Voting In House Elections: Revisiting the Historical Record
David Jones
Public Opinion Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The literature portrays the congressional voter of the 1950s through the early 1970s as having been unwilling or unable to hold Congress electorally accountable for its collective legislative performance. In contrast, recent literature has demonstrated that in elections from 1974 onward, voters have regularly used congressional performance evaluations as part of their voting decisions. Specifically, poor evaluations of Congress lower support for candidates from the ruling majority party, all else being equal. This research note hypothesizes that Americans in the earlier era were willing and able to hold Congress electorally accountable for its collective performance in the same partisan fashion as today's voters are, but that this behavior was obscured from previous researchers because they lacked access to appropriate empirical data. Using survey data largely unavailable to scholars of the earlier era, I find evidence supporting this hypothesis.
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Legislators and Administrators: Complex Relationships Complicated by Term Limits
Marjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson, John Strate, Kelly Leroux, Richard Elling, Lyke Thompson & Charles Elder
Legislative Studies Quarterly, February 2010, Pages 57-89
Abstract:
State legislators' relationships with administrators have received scant attention in the literature despite the importance of these relationships for delivery of public services. We explored whether or not the legislator-administrator relationship in one professional state legislature resembles Congress's oversight of federal agencies. We also assessed whether or not term limits changed this relationship. Our findings indicate that monitoring state agencies was a low priority for this legislature, and it dropped even lower after term limits were implemented. More specifically, we found some institutional roles to be associated with legislators placing a higher priority on monitoring, especially before term limits, whereas some individual motives were associated with a lower priority, especially after term limits. Legislators exhibited more confusion about the process of monitoring after term limits.
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Assessing the Effects of Municipal Term Limits on Fiscal Policy in U.S. Cities
Adam McGlynn & Dari Sylvester
State and Local Government Review, August 2010, Pages 118-132
Abstract:
The arguments for and against term limits have been the subject of debate since the mid-1990s. Proponents claim term limits bring new energy and ideas to government, while opponents argue they shift power to special interests and the bureaucracy. Analyses of the true effects of term limits have been focused on their implementation at the state level. This article examines the effects of term limits on taxation, city employment, and spending on other public policies at the municipal level. Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and pooled cross-sectional time series models, the authors find that the presence of term limits has only a modest effect on economic and distributive public policies in U.S. cities as a city's economic milieu has a greater effect on taxation and policy expenditures.
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Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration
Daniel Carpenter
Perspectives on Politics, September 2010, Pages 825-846
Abstract:
The politics of financial reform represent a genuine test case for American politics and its institutions. The Obama administration's proposed reforms pit common (largely unorganized) interests against well-organized and wealthy minority interests. I describe how the withering and unfolding of financial reform has occurred not through open institutional opposition but through a quieter process that I call institutional strangulation. Institutional strangulation consists of much more than the stoppage of policies by aggregation of veto points as designed in the US Constitution. In the case of financial reform, it has non-constitutional veto points, including committee politics and cultural veto points (gender and professional finance), strategies of partisan intransigence, and perhaps most significantly, the bureaucratic politics of turf and reputation. These patterns can weaken common-interest reforms, especially in the broad arena of consumer protection.