Interdependence
War and Responsibility
Patrick Hulme
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars and policymakers bemoan an imperial presidency in the war powers context, where the unilateral use of force is frequently interpreted as evidence of an unconstrained executive. Focusing on the strong blame avoidance incentives faced by politicians in the military intervention setting, I develop a model of the war powers focused on "Loss Responsibility Costs." It suggests that presidents only risk full-scale war when they have the political cover provided by formal authorization, which forces lawmakers to share responsibility. Smaller interventions, in contrast, are frequently undertaken unilaterally because having the president act alone is consistent with congressional preferences for blame avoidance. Novel sentiment data based on tens of thousands of congressional speeches supports the claim that when the president acts unilaterally, they almost always act alongside lawmaker support, who favor intervention but avoid formally endorsing the endeavor. Altogether, it suggests legislators' influence over war is stronger than commonly appreciated.
Atomic Responsiveness: How Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapon Use Shapes Elite Beliefs and Preferences
Michal Smetana et al.
Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey Working Paper, June 2025
Abstract:
A recent wave of studies using surveys and survey experiments has significantly advanced scholarly understanding of the microfoundations of the "nuclear taboo." However, this methodological approach has faced critiques for relying on samples of the general population to study the traditionally elite domain of nuclear policy. In this research note, we address the central question: Can public opinion influence elite views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with an elite experiment conducted on three samples: U.S. government employees, U.K. government employees, and U.K. parliamentarians. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine elite responsiveness to public preferences regarding nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. The results highlight three mechanisms through which public opinion can affect elite nuclear decisions. First, high public support notably increases elites' willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Second, in such situations, public backing shapes elite beliefs about their leaders' willingness to order nuclear strikes. But the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent after the nuclear taboo has been breached. Third, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences elite perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the potential role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear weapon use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.
The Power Elite in Greenland
Morten Fischer Sivertsen, Anton Grau Larsen & Christoph Houman Ellersgaard
British Journal of Sociology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this research note, we map the power elite in Greenland, amidst the current geopolitical interest in the nation. Using social network analysis, we identify a power elite of 123 individuals as the central circle in an extensive affiliation network data on 3412 positions held by a total 2052 individuals in 456 affiliations. We find an integrated and cohesive power elite dominated by actors from politics and public and private enterprises. When comparing this central circle to the previous studies of power elites in the former colonial power and current sovereign, Denmark, the political sector and the state are stronger in Greenland at the expense of the private sector. However, while the elite is integrated, we also identify potentials of fracturing. Thus we find a division between politicians -- who are more likely to have childhood and educational ties to Greenland -- and other elite groups -- in particular private business -- who are more likely to have academic degrees, be male and live in the Capital, Nuuk. The network of the elite is also clearly clustered around the strength of affiliation with Greenlandic society. We conclude by discussing how the potential fracturing of the Greenlandic elite along ethnic division lines may lead to a lack of cohesion and legitimacy entering the current geopolitical tensions surrounding the world's largest island.
Detecting pro-kremlin disinformation using large language models
Marianne Kramer, Yevgeniy Golovchenko & Frederik Hjorth
Research & Politics, June 2025
Abstract:
A growing body of literature examines manipulative information by detecting political mis-/disinformation in text data. This line of research typically involves highly costly manual annotation of text for manual content analysis, and/or training and validating automated downstream approaches. We examine whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can detect pro-Kremlin disinformation about the war in Ukraine, focusing on the case of the downing of the civilian flight MH17. We benchmark methods using a large set of tweets labeled by expert annotators. We show that both open and closed LLMs can accurately detect pro-Kremlin disinformation tweets, outperforming both a research assistant and supervised models used in earlier research and at drastically lower cost compared to either research assistants or crowd workers. Our findings contribute to the literature on mis/-disinformation by showcasing how LLMs can substantially lower the costs of detection even when the labeling requires complex, context-specific knowledge about a given case.
We Only Care What You Do, Not Who You Are: Reexamining Human Rights and Public Support for War
Weifang Xu, Taylor Kinsley Chewning & Qing Wang
Journal of Experimental Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does the public apply a "double standard" for human rights abuses based on the perpetrator's alliance status? Research shows that individuals are more supportive of military action against states that violate human rights. However, other studies claim that condemnations of violations are often contingent upon the strategic relationship with the perpetrators. In this paper, we bridge these different strands of literature by examining whether the effect of foreign states' human rights practices on public support for war depends on the alliance status of the violator. To investigate this interaction, we conducted two preregistered experiments that independently randomized the state's human rights practices and U.S. alliance status. Both experiments reveal that the alliance status of the human rights violator has a negligible effect on support for war. Consequently, our findings challenge the prevailing notion that the public applies a double standard for human rights violations.
Do People Around the World Care Where Their Data Are Stored?
Jeffrey Prince & Scott Wallsten
Information Economics and Policy, December 2025
Abstract:
Using carefully designed discrete choice surveys, we measure how much individuals care whether their data are stored domestically, i.e., the premium people place on limiting the sharing of their data to their home country compared to elsewhere. We conduct this measure across countries (United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Italy, India, and France) and data types (home address and phone number, personal information on finances, biometrics, health status, location, networks, communications, and music preferences). We find only modest evidence of added value resulting from data localization; to the extent that there is added value from localization, it appears to largely come for data types where privacy (i.e., full restrictions on data sharing) is already of high value: financial (account balance) and biometric (facial image) data, and home address and phone number. We also find for the U.S., U.K., Italy, India and France no evidence that excluding China and Russia when allowing for international data sharing affects the data localization premium. Interestingly, for Japan and South Korea, we find evidence of a preference against excluding China and Russia if data are to be shared internationally. We discuss privacy policy implications.
Mandate Complexity and United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions
Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman & Megan Shannon
British Journal of Political Science, May 2025
Abstract:
United Nations peacekeeping is an important instrument for maintaining international peace, but the mandates that peacekeeping operations are expected to implement are increasingly complex. This trend has consequences. We argue that certain member states are incentivized by the benefits of partaking in complex missions. These include 'process' benefits such as reimbursement payments, training, and reputation building. Specifically, non-democratic states are more likely to make greater contributions to missions with complex mandates than democratic states. In a global analysis of UN member peacekeeping contributions from 1990 to 2022, we show that as mandate complexity increases, non-democracies make larger contributions relative to democracies. While democracies do not shy away from supporting peacekeeping, they resist substantial contributions to the ambitiously mandated missions that they have often themselves promoted. These findings contribute to ongoing academic discussions about the challenge of recruiting sufficient resources to pursue peacekeeping while insisting on a liberal global order.
The effect of World War II spending and Army service on the lifespan of the Black population
Adriana Lleras-Muney et al.
Explorations in Economic History, July 2025
Abstract:
We investigate how World War II affected the longevity of the Black population. We focus attention on two aspects of the war. First, during the war a very large number of men served in the military. Second, many companies received large Federal contracts to support the war effort and employed a large number of workers in the production of war-related goods and services. Previous work has found that these events appear to have improved the economic conditions of Black men after the war. We document that war contracts indeed increased the age at death of Black men, but not of White men, lowering racial disparities in lifespan. The results for Black women are similar but less robust. Although WWII Army veterans lived longer than civilians, our causal estimates of the effects of serving during the war are imprecise for Black men.