Getting Philosophical
The Relation Between Attributions of Mental Capacities and Moral Standing Across Six Diverse Cultures
Bastian Jaeger & Maarten Bosten
Psychological Science, April 2026, Pages 243-254
Abstract:
Whose welfare and interests matter from a moral perspective? This question is at the center of many polarizing debates, for example, on the ethicality of abortion or meat consumption. A widely cited hypothesis holds that attributions of moral standing are guided by which mental capacities an entity is perceived to have. Specifically, perceived sentience (the capacity to feel pleasure and pain) is thought to be the primary determinant, rather than perceived agency (the capacity to navigate the world and social relationships) or other abilities. This has been described as a general feature of moral cognition, but the evidence for this is mixed and overwhelmingly based on Western participants. Here, we examined the link between attributions of mind and moral standing across six culturally diverse countries -- Brazil, Nigeria, Italy, Saudi Arabia, India, and the Philippines -- using a sample of 1,255 participants (aged 18–74 years old) who were recruited via the online platform Toloka. In every country, entities’ moral standing was most strongly related to their perceived sentience.
The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness
Alexander Lerchner
Google Working Paper, March 2026
Abstract:
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience -- a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.
Diversity and Prosociality in NYC Neighborhoods: Evidence from a Lost Wallet Experiment
Shannon Rieger, Delia Baldassarri & Maria Abascal
American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars concerned with consequences of urbanization and differentiation generally associate ethnoracial diversity with negative social outcomes. But a rich sociological tradition envisions diversification as an antecedent to generalized prosociality. Transcending diversity research’s reliance on parochial understandings of prosociality, we field a lost wallet experiment in NYC that addresses sampling shortcomings in past work. We strategically sample a set of neighborhoods that allow us to disentangle contextual heterogeneity from minority share and socioeconomic status, recovering the association between prosocial behavior and ethnoracial diversity per se. We experimentally manipulate wallet owners’ racial/ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds, shedding light on the extent to which prosociality in large cities is parochial or generalized. Once ethnoracial composition and socioeconomic status are properly considered, return rates are unrelated to diversity and negatively associated with economic deprivation. Return rates are comparable across recipients from different ethnoracial and economic backgrounds, suggesting that people in NYC experience a generalized form of solidarity.
What Drives a Contemporary Lack of Trust in Government and Science in the United States?
Kristin Lunz Trujillo & Mateo Trujillo
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent surveys suggest that Americans’ trust in institutions has decreased, including trust in science and government. Such trends could have significant effects on the health of democracy, scientific advancement, information consumption, and more. However, trust can stem from different considerations. In some cases, a lack of trust arises from ill will or suspicion over integrity, that is, concerns about immorality or wrong doing. It can also arise from pessimism about competence. These different causes elicit distinct reactions, which could motivate varied reactions toward groups that are not trusted. Using multiple original surveys of US adults (total N = 3,894), including an original experiment, we find that seeing scientists and politicians as morally bad -- but not as incompetent -- leads to lower trust in these individuals. This suggests that perceptions of moral wrongdoing are stronger drivers of lower political and scientific trust in recent years, compared to perceived incompetence. These results hold in correlational analysis, although the effects vary somewhat by partisanship. Together, these results have important implications for understanding the driver of major ills that threaten the functioning of society and government.
The Moral Standing of Created Agents: Bad Is More Owned Than Good
Emily Stonehouse & Ori Friedman
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Created agents are a staple of fiction but technological advances are making them increasingly viable as a reality. These creations introduce thorny questions about their moral standing, including questions about whether they can be owned. In seven preregistered experiments (N = 2,499), we investigated whether created agents are more likely to be seen as owned if they cause harm. This prediction was suggested by the hypothesis that ownership is sometimes used to express moral responsibility, though it runs against the tendency for harm to introduce restrictions on ownership. In all experiments, participants more often judged that created agents belonged to their inventors when they caused harm than when they did good. The final experiment then showed that these judgments do not strongly align with assessments of rights over created agents. Overall, the findings suggest that harmfulness changes the moral standing of created agents in a novel way, increasing perceptions of them as property.
Canceling creativity? Exploring artist censure as a function of crime type
Rebecka Hahnel-Peeters et al.
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, forthcoming
Abstract:
Art consumption is part of human sociality. Embedded in myriad think pieces and social media posts about the #MeToo movement were questions about how people should view artwork by artists accused of sexual transgressions. Central to think pieces about R Kelly, Woody Allen, and so on, is a search for answers: “Should we now discard once-beloved artworks?” Beyond being of great public interest, such questions about people’s reappraisal may have both implications for (a) other cultural products (e.g., scientific findings, vaccines) and (b) economic impacts for those in the multibillion-dollar art and entertainment industries. Across four studies, we produce some of the first work empirically describing how Americans reappraise artists’ works considering criminal accusations. Across four studies, Americans (N = 1,527; 58.68% women), appraised artworks, learned new information that the artist was accused of a crime -- including sexual assault and murder -- and reappraised that work. Upon reappraisal, Americans more strongly endorsed censuring art (e.g., preventing its display) by artists accused of sexual assault than other crimes, Cohen’s d = 0.30–0.61. Americans’ liking of the artwork did not change upon reappraisal. This effect held whether art was novel or familiar and beloved, when controlling for participant political orientation or art knowledge, and even as participants deemed murder more morally wrong. Discussion includes possible explanations rooted in evolutionary psychology, such as coordinated condemnation of morally reprehensible behaviors.
Future generations hold the lowest moral standing, even below present-day marginalized human and nonhuman outgroups
Christina Jinhee Capozzoli, Kyle Fiore Law & Stylianos Syropoulos
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, forthcoming
Abstract:
Climate change, poverty, and inequality pose significant threats to the well-being of future generations, making it essential to advocate for their interests in present-day decisions. Yet little is known about how people morally evaluate future generations relative to other distant groups, such as human outgroups and nature (plants, animals). Moreover, does this perception change among those who exhibit impartial intergenerational beneficence (i.e., concern for all future generations), or when moral concern is framed as zero-sum? Across 15 studies, we find that future generations consistently receive less moral concern than present-day targets already ascribed low levels of concern. This pattern holds whether moral expansiveness is framed as unlimited or zero-sum and persists even among individuals who typically care deeply about future generations, regardless of their temporal distance. These findings suggest that future generations hold a uniquely disadvantaged position in the moral hierarchy -- not because of perceived constraints on moral concern but due to factors intrinsic to their exceptional psychological distance from the self here and now.
Technologized Reproduction in Space: A Space-Bioethical Case for Assisted Procreation
Maurizio Balistreri & Konrad Szocik
Bioethics, forthcoming
Abstract:
With the increasing feasibility of space colonization, the issue of reproduction in space is becoming more relevant. As new settlements on the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies emerge, ensuring generational continuity will be essential for the survival and growth of these communities. The challenges of space living, such as extreme environmental conditions and limited resources, raise critical questions about the practicality and morality of reproduction in these contexts. This paper argues that in extraterrestrial space, human reproduction based on assisted reproductive technologies is morally preferable to sexual reproduction. We explore the benefits of technologies like embryo selection, genome editing, and artificial wombs, emphasizing their potential to mitigate the risks posed by space environments. There is no doubt that the idea of human reproduction based solely on technology is controversial and counterintuitive, even if it were to be applied only, at least initially, for the continued existence of the human population settled in space. Nevertheless, there are strong rationales for the fact that non-sexual reproduction is not only beneficial, but also has moral advantages. Finally, we also examine the social and political implications of a society that moves beyond sexual reproduction, including the reduction of gendered oppression and the redefinition of family structures. We suggest that these advancements could transform reproduction not only in space but also on Earth, potentially reducing injustices caused by human biology and reshaping societal norms and traditional view on family.