Business Model
Johannes Abeler, Juljana Calaki, Kai Andree & Christoph Basek
Economics Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
How should firms react to customer complaints after an unsatisfactory purchase? In a field experiment, we test the effect of different reactions and find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation.
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Elections and Discretionary Accruals: Evidence from 2004
Karthik Ramanna & Sugata Roychowdhury
Journal of Accounting Research, May 2010, Pages 445-475
Abstract:
We examine the accrual choices of outsourcing firms with links to U.S. congressional candidates during the 2004 elections, when corporate outsourcing was a major campaign issue. We find that politically connected firms with more extensive outsourcing activities have more income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Further, relative to adjacent periods, the evidence is concentrated in the two calendar quarters immediately preceding the 2004 election, consistent with heightened incentives for firms to manage earnings during the election season. The incentives can be attributed to donor firms' concerns about the potentially negative consequences of scrutiny over outsourcing for themselves and for their affiliated candidates.
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Equity on Demand: The Netflix Approach to Compensation
David Larcker, Brian Tayan & Allan McCall
Stanford Case Study, March 2010
Abstract:
Netflix was among a small group of Silicon Valley companies to emerge from the technology bubble of the late 1990s a clear winner in terms of growth, market share, and profitability. That Netflix was able not only to prevail over this competition but also to thrive was largely attributable to the culture of freedom and responsibility inculcated by founder Reed Hastings. To foster this culture, the company adopted a series of unique employment practices that were meant to attract, retain, and motivate the type of employee that Netflix valued. Among these practices was a compensation system with several unconventional features. Whereas most companies provided compensation packages with a predetermined mix of cash and equity-based awards, Netflix turned the model on its head and allowed employees to request their own mix. Management was interested in finding out whether this practice supported or detracted from the company's main objectives for its employees.
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Occupational Safety and Profit Maximization: Friends or Foes?
Pavel Yakovlev & Russell Sobel
Journal of Socio-Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
The rise of the Industrial Revolution is often depicted as a cause of hazardous working conditions and is skillfully epitomized in William Blake's tale of a child chimney sweeper. Conventional wisdom puts firm profit in conflict with occupational safety. We reexamine this argument noting that injuries are very costly to firms because they lead to higher wage premiums, worker compensation, and costly work stoppages. We hypothesize that it is precisely for these reasons that firms in the industries with dangerous working conditions have the strongest incentives to innovate and substitute more capital for labor. Using a longitudinal panel of U.S. industries, we test and confirm our hypothesis that higher injury rates lead to higher capital stock per worker, over time. Moreover, our estimates suggest that firms provide more capital and equipment per worker than what would have been there based solely on the compensating wage differential.
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Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome and Banality of Wrongdoing
Dennis Balch & Robert Armstrong
Journal of Business Ethics, March 2010, Pages 291-303
Abstract:
This study proposes a conceptual model to explain persistent, accepted-as-normal corporate wrongdoing (hereafter banality of wrongdoing), particularly for high performance organizations. The model describes five explanatory variables: the culture of competition, ends-biased leadership, missionary zeal, legitimizing myth, and the corporate cocoon. Our thesis is that the nature of competition drives both legitimate and illegitimate goal-seeking to adopt an iconoclastic (rule-breaking) orientation. High performance organizations are favorable hosts for wrongdoing because high performance requires aggressive behavior at the ethical margins of what is acceptable. The way leadership reacts to competition sets the stage for ethical or unethical cultures to develop. Ends-biased leadership will project strong vision, using ideology and legitimizing myth as tools to inspire and motivate. The resulting missionary zeal justifies using questionable means because of the perceived value of the end. One critical method for building strong culture is creating a sense of being separate and apart from the ordinary. This cocoon effect may create a self-referential value system that is significantly at odds with mainstream culture and in which wrongdoing is banal. We intend an empirical study of the variables described in this model.
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Mohammad Amin
Economics Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present paper contributes to the literature on legal origins by showing that the ease with which information on rules and regulations is available to firms is much better in common law compared with civil law countries.
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Why do Firms Use Non-Linear Incentive Schemes? Experimental Evidence on Sorting and Overconfidence
Ian Larkin & Stephen Leider
Harvard Working Paper, March 2010
Abstract:
Non-linear incentive schemes are commonly used to determine employee pay, despite their distortionary impact. We investigate possible reasons for their widespread use by examining the relationship between convex pay schemes and overconfidence. In a laboratory experiment, subjects chose between a piece rate and a convex pay scheme. We find that overconfident subjects are more likely than others to choose the convex scheme, even when it leads to lower pay. Overconfident subjects also persist in making the mistake despite clear feedback. These results suggest non-linear pay schemes may help companies select and retain overconfident workers, and may reduce the wage bill.
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Xue Wang
Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
I study how increased internal control disclosure requirements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affect annual corporate governance decisions regarding CFOs. Using non-CEO, non-COO executive officers as a control group, I find that CFOs of firms with weak internal controls receive lower compensation and experience higher forced turnover rates after the passage of SOX. In contrast, CFOs of firms with strong internal controls receive higher compensation and do not experience significant changes in forced turnover rates. These results are consistent with the "disclosure of type" hypothesis, which suggests that the mandatory internal control disclosures under SOX are a credible mechanism that effectively distinguishes good CFOs from bad ones by revealing the firm's internal control quality. The empirical evidence thus supports the notion that mandated increases in disclosure reduce information asymmetry in the executive labor market.
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The Economic Consequences of IPO Spinning
Xiaoding Liu & Jay Ritter
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using a sample of fifty-six companies going public in 1996-2000 in which top executives received allocations of other hot initial public offerings (IPOs) from the bookrunner, a practice known as spinning, we examine the consequences of spinning. The fifty-six IPOs had first-day returns that were, on average, 23% higher than similar IPOs. The profits collected by these executives were only a small fraction of the incremental amount of money left on the table by their companies when they went public. These companies were dramatically less likely to switch investment bankers in a follow-on offer: only 6% of issuers whose executives were spun switched underwriters, whereas 31% of other issuers switched. These findings suggest that the spinning of executives accomplished its goal of affecting corporate decisions.
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The Ethics of Organizations: A Longitudinal Study of the U.S. Working Population
Muel Kaptein
Journal of Business Ethics, April 2010, Pages 601-618
Abstract:
The ethics of organizations has received much attention in recent years. This raises the question of whether the ethics of organizations has also improved. In 1999, 2004, and 2008, a survey was conducted of 12,196 U.S. managers and employees. The results show that the ethical culture of organizations improved in the period between 1999 and 2004. Between 2004 and 2008 unethical behavior and its consequences declined and the scope of ethics programs expanded while ethical culture showed no significant improvement during the same period. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for future research and practice.
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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
Christopher Armstrong, Alan Jagolinzer & David Larcker
Journal of Accounting Research, May 2010, Pages 225-271
Abstract:
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.
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Joseph Engelberg, Pengjie Gao & Christopher Parsons
University of North Carolina Working Paper, February 2010
Abstract:
We explore whether personal connections between employees at firms and banks influence lending and borrowing practices. Such firm-bank connections predict large concessions in interest rates, comparable to single shifts in credit ratings. Personal relationships also predict larger loan amounts and fewer restrictive covenants. We find no evidence that these terms reflect "sweetheart deals." Subsequent firm performance (e.g., future credit ratings and stock returns) improves after completing a "connected" bank deal, suggesting social networks between banks and firms either lead to better information flow ex ante or better monitoring ex post.
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The Ethical Environment of Tax Professionals: Partner and Non-Partner Perceptions and Experiences
Donna Bobek, Amy Hageman & Robin Radtke
Journal of Business Ethics, April 2010, Pages 637-654
Abstract:
This article examines perceptions of tax partners and non-partner tax practitioners regarding their CPA firms' ethical environment, as well as experiences with ethical dilemmas. Prior research emphasizes the importance of executive leadership in creating an ethical climate (e.g., Weaver et al., Acad Manage Rev 42(1):41-57, 1999; Trevino et al., Hum Relat 56(1):5-37, 2003; Schminke et al., Organ Dyn 36(2):171-186, 2007). Thus, it is important to consider whether firm partners and other employees have congruent perceptions and experiences. Based on the responses of 144 tax practitioners employed at CPA firms, the results show that tax partners rate the ethical environment of their firms as stronger than non-partner tax practitioners, particularly among those who describe a self-identified ethical dilemma. Tax partners also report having encountered more of the common examples of researcher-provided ethical dilemmas than non-partner tax practitioners, although non-partners perceive that certain ethical dilemmas occur at a higher rate than partners do. Overall, this study provides evidence of a disconnect between tax partners and non-partner tax practitioners with respect to perceptions of organizational ethics. Suggestions for potential remedies are offered.