Borderline
Bridging Partisan Divisions over Antiterrorism Policies: The Role of Threat Perceptions
Neil Malhotra & Elizabeth Popp
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The authors examine how changes in perceptions of threat affect individuals' policy views as well as the political implications of this relationship. They administered a survey experiment to a representative sample of the U.S. population in which they exogenously manipulated individuals' perceived likelihood of a future terrorist attack on American soil and assessed subsequent changes in support for terrorism-related public policies. They find that reducing perceived threat substantially decreases support for policies intended to combat terrorism and that this effect is concentrated among Democrats who believe another terrorist attack is likely to occur. These results suggest that threat, as part of the larger information environment, can alter partisan divisions on controversial policies.
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Dennis Foster & Jonathan Keller
Conflict Management and Peace Science, November 2010, Pages 417-441
Abstract:
Despite considerable scholarship regarding the degree to which the international use of force generates popular rallies, no work has addressed the possibility that leaders' managerial philosophies and psychological predispositions systematically influence their assessments of whether or not diversion "works". In this article, we test hypotheses-conceived through direct reference to work in political psychology-which suggest that the degree to which presidents are innately concerned with the maintenance of the American "in-group" is an important predictor of whether they scapegoat international "out-groups" and, by extension, whether they choose strategies of diversionary foreign conflict or more cordial foreign engagement when facing domestic problems. Several analyses of American foreign policy behavior for the period 1953-2000 produce findings that clearly are at odds with these hypotheses, in that in-group biased presidents are actually less likely to use force and more likely to attend superpower summits when faced with a poor economy. We believe that these unexpected findings have serious implications for both the psychological study of international conflict and the plausibility of the "traditional" diversionary hypothesis.
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Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada
David Jaeger, Esteban Klor, Sami Miaari & Daniele Paserman
NBER Working Paper, October 2010
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether attacks against Israeli targets help Palestinian factions gain public support. We link individual level survey data to the full list of Israeli fatalities during the period of the Second Intifada (2000-2006), and estimate a flexible discrete choice model for faction supported. We find some support for the "outbidding" hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community. In particular, the two leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, gain in popularity following successful attacks against Israeli targets. Our results suggest, however, that most movement occurs within either the secular groups or the Islamist groups, and not between them. That is, Fatah's gains come at the expense of smaller secular factions while Hamas' gains come at the expense of smaller Islamic factions and the disaffected. In contrast, attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad lower support for that faction.
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Terrorism and Capital Markets: The Effects of the Madrid and London Bomb Attacks
Christos Kollias, Stephanos Papadamou & Apostolos Stagiannis
International Review of Economics & Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using event study methodology and GARCH family models, the paper investigates the effects of two terrorist incidents - the bomb attacks of 11th March 2004 in Madrid and 7th July 2005 in London - on equity sectors. Significant negative abnormal returns are widespread across the majority of sectors in the Spanish markets but not so in the case of London. Furthermore, the market rebound is much quicker in London compared to the Spanish markets where the attackers were not suicide bombers. Nevertheless, the overall findings point to only a transitory impact on return and volatility that does not last for a long period.
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Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk
Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel
Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peace-keeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.
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Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics
T.V. Paul
Review of International Studies, October 2010, Pages 853-863
Abstract:
The non-use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 has emerged as a major puzzle in international politics. Traditional International Relations scholarship views this largely as a function of the deterrent relationship that emerged between the nuclear powers, especially during the Cold War era. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used against non-nuclear states, despite temptations to use them, remains a challenge to the deterrence-only explanation. More normatively oriented scholars have argued that a taboo has emerged against the non-use of nuclear weapons. Nina Tannenwald's book, The Nuclear Taboo is the most comprehensive study on this subject which relies on constructivist logic of inter-subjective taboo-like prohibition in accounting for the puzzle. While I see much merit in Tannenwald's empirical case studies, it is far-fetched to call the non-use largely a function of a taboo-like prohibition. For, taboos by their very nature forbid discussions of their breaking, whereas nuclear states have national military strategies that call for nuclear use under certain circumstances. They have also in many crises situations considered the use of nuclear weapons. I have argued in my book, The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford University Press, 2009), that a more modest tradition can be given partial credit for the absence of nuclear attacks on non-nuclear states. The tradition emerged because of a realisation of the horrendous effects of nuclear attack (a material fact) which generated reputation costs for a potential user. These reputation costs in turn generated self-deterrence which has helped to create a tradition which is partially restraining nuclear states from using their weapons for anything other than existential deterrence. Unlike Tannenwald, I contend that the tradition is not a strict taboo and hence it can be altered if material and political circumstances compel nuclear states to do so. The recent policy changes that have taken place in nuclear powers such as the US, Russia, UK, and France do not augur well for the tradition as the conditions for atomic use have been expanded to include prevention, pre-emption and other non-proliferation objectives involving rogue states and terrorist groups.
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Who's to Blame? The Distribution of Responsibility in Developing Democracies
Isabella Alcañiz & Timothy Hellwig
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
International structures tie the hands of policy makers in the developing world. Dependency on the world economy is blamed for low growth, high volatility and less redistribution of income than average, but the effect of international constraints on mass politics is relatively unknown. This study examines how citizens of developing democracies assign responsibility for policy outcomes. A theory of the distribution of responsibility, combining insights from the political economy of development and the study of mass behaviour, is presented. Evidence from seventeen Latin American countries shows that citizens often blame policy outcomes on international and private-sector actors, to which they, as voters, have no direct recourse. Ties to world markets and the International Monetary Fund, especially foreign debt, shift responsibility towards international actors and tend to exonerate national politicians.
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Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions
Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor
NBER Working Paper, October 2010
Abstract:
This paper examines whether house demolitions are an effective counterterrorism tactic against suicide terrorism. We link original longitudinal micro-level data on houses demolished by the Israeli Defense Forces with data on the universe of suicide attacks against Israeli targets. By exploiting spatial and time variation in house demolitions and suicide terror attacks during the second Palestinian uprising, we show that punitive house demolitions (those targeting Palestinian suicide terrorists and terror operatives) cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. The effect dissipates over time and by geographic distance. In contrast, we observe that precautionary house demolitions (demolitions justified by the location of the house but not related to the identity or any action of the house's owner) cause a significant increase in the number of suicide terror attacks. The results are consistent with the view that selective violence is an effective tool to combat terrorist groups, whereas indiscriminate violence backfires.
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The Effects of a Serious Game on Role-Taking and Willingness to Help
Wei Peng, Mira Lee & Carrie Heeter
Journal of Communication, December 2010, Pages 723-742
Abstract:
Serious games are emerging as a new medium for social change. This study investigated the influence of presentation mode afforded by different media on willingness to help in the context of humanitarian aid. Two online experiments were conducted. The first experiment demonstrated that playing the Darfur is Dying game elicited greater role-taking and resulted in greater willingness to help the Darfurian people than reading a text conveying the same information. The second experiment deconstructed the variable presentation mode in more detail by adding a game watching condition. Similar results were found such that game playing resulted in greater role-taking and willingness to help than game watching and text reading. Implications for researchers and game developers are also discussed.
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Deepak Malhotra & Jeremy Ginges
Judgment and Decision Making, October 2010, Pages 420-427
Abstract:
The paper extends research on fixed-pie perceptions by suggesting that disputants may prefer proposals that are perceived to be equally attractive to both parties (i.e., balanced) rather than one-sided, because balanced agreements are seen as more likely to be successfully implemented. We test our predictions using data on Israeli support for the Geneva Accords, an agreement for a two state solution negotiated by unofficial delegations of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 2003. The results demonstrate that Israelis are more likely to support agreements that are seen favorably by other Israelis, but - contrary to fixed-pie predictions - Israeli support for the accords does not diminish simply because a majority of Palestinians favors (rather than opposes) the accords. We show that implementation concerns create a demand among Israelis for balance in the degree to which each side favors (or opposes) the agreement. The effect of balance is noteworthy in that it creates considerable support for proposals even when a majority of Israelis and Palestinians oppose the deal.
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Andrea Birdsall
Global Governance, October-December 2010, Pages 451-469
Abstract:
The International Criminal Court is a new mechanism for the global governance of human rights that enjoys broad support from a large number of states. The United States expressed its hostile opposition especially in the early years, claiming that the ICC was harmful to US national interests. This attitude toward the court changed over the years, and a more pragmatic approach toward the ICC is now discernible. The United States had to acknowledge that actions taken in opposition to the ICC began to be harmful to its own national interests and it also realized the national interest utility the court has despite the deep-seated opposition to the concept of supranational sovereignty. This article looks at the reasons for opposition by the United States, its initial hostile position, and changes in the US approach toward the ICC.
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Stefano DellaVigna & Eliana La Ferrara
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, November 2010, Pages 26-57
Abstract
We propose a method to detect illegal arms trade based on investor knowledge. We focus on countries under arms embargo and identify events that suddenly increase or decrease conflict intensity. If a weapon-making company is trading illegally, an event that increases the demand for arms may increase stock prices. We find positive event returns for companies headquartered in countries with high corruption and low transparency in arms trade. We also suggest a method to detect potential embargo violations based on chains of reactions by individual stocks. The presumed violations positively correlate with the number of UN investigations and Internet stories.
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Nazi Germany's preparation for war: Evidence from revised industrial investment series
Jonas Scherner
European Review of Economic History, December 2010, Pages 433-468
Abstract:
To date we lack reliable data on the degree of industrial investment in the Third Reich. Additionally, our comprehensive knowledge of the quantitative significance of the war-related industrial branches is extremely fragmented. Precise figures are, however, crucial if we are to arrive at a correct depiction of the political economy of the Third Reich. Based on previously neglected sources, it will be shown that, beginning in 1936/7, Germany experienced a spectacular investment boom, primarily targeted at broadening the industrial foundation for war. The findings of this article are relevant to several historiographical debates, calling into question both the older Blitzkrieg account and the conventional view of the armaments miracle.
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Trends in American Jewish Attachment to Israel: An Assessment of the "Distancing" Hypothesis
Theodore Sasson, Charles Kadushin & Leonard Saxe
Contemporary Jewry, October 2010, Pages 297-319
Abstract:
In recent years, social scientists have claimed that American Jews, in particular in the younger generation, have grown more distant from Israel. This paper draws on evidence from national surveys conducted over two decades to assess the "distancing hypothesis." The survey data suggest that emotional attachment to Israel has varied within a narrow band, with no consistent pattern of increase or decrease. Predictions of distancing appear to be incorrect and several factors which were presumed to underlie distancing are examined: generational turnover, intermarriage and political alienation. These factors appear to have only small impact on the overall level of American Jewish attachment to Israel. An alternative narrative is suggested and the implications for the future relationship of American Jews to Israel are discussed.
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Rainbow, Snow, and the Poplar's Song: The "Annihilative Naming" of Israeli Military Practices
Dalia Gavriely-Nuri
Armed Forces & Society, October 2010, Pages 825-842
Abstract:
This article explores the phenomenon of military naming, that is, the act of giving a name to military practices such as military operations, weaponry, and military units. The basic theoretical supposition is that military naming is a simple and useful mechanism that might be employed to blur undesired aspects-such as the human and economical costs-associated with the respective practices. Inspired by John B. Thompson's ‘‘strategies of operation of ideology,'' the research uses the construct of strategies of annihilative naming to analyze a corpus of 239 Israeli names of military operations and weaponry. By using names coming from nature and the Bible, the Israeli military uses three strategies-naturalization, euphemization, and legitimation-that mediate Israeli public opinion toward controversial military operations as well as weaponry development. Future research of other military names will support the construction of generalizations about this important phenomenon.
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Individuals v. States: The Correlates of Human Rights Committee Rulings, 1979-2007
Wade Cole
Social Science Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper examines the outcomes of individual abuse claims filed against states under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as decided by the Human Rights Committee (HRC). Results from selection models that account for a country's initial decision to join the Optional Protocol and an individual's subsequent decision to file a complaint under it show that the substantive nature of complaints were more determinative of HRC outcomes than were country-level characteristics. Claims relating to due process rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms most often resulted in violations, whereas claims pertaining to discrimination, suffrage rights, and the rights of women and children were much less successful. Only two country-level characteristics robustly affected HRC outcomes, net of rights claims: democratizing countries were found in violation at higher rates than were other countries, while violation rates declined as a function of aggregate wealth.