Bias
Partisan Vision Biases Determination of Voter Intent
Peter Ubel & Brian Zikmund-Fisher
PS: Political Science & Politics, January 2011, Pages 81-84
Abstract:
In close, disputed elections, outcomes can depend on determinations of voter intent for ballots that have been filled out improperly. We surveyed 899 adult Minnesotans during a time when the state's U.S. Senate election was still disputed and presented them with ambiguous ballots similar to ballots under dispute in the same election. We randomized participants to three experimental groups, across which we varied the names on the ballot. We found that participants' judgments of voter intent were strongly biased by their voting preferences (p < .002 in all four ballots).
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Competing to Be Certain (But Wrong): Market Dynamics and Excessive Confidence in Judgment
Joseph Radzevick & Don Moore
Management Science, January 2011, Pages 93-106
Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate how market competition contributes to the expression of overconfidence among those competing for influence. We find evidence that market competition exacerbates the tendency to express excessive confidence. This evidence comes from experiments in which advisors attempt to sell their advice. In the first, advisors must compete with other advice sellers. In the second, advisors and their customers are paired. Advisors are overconfident in both studies and it helps advisors sell their advice. However, competition between advisors in the market further exacerbates overconfidence. In a third study, we demonstrate that the market competition drives overconfidence even when advisors vary in quality. We also investigate the strategic expressions and interpretations of confidence by both sides in the exchange.
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Visceral fit: While in a visceral state, associated states of the world seem more likely
Jane Risen & Clayton Critcher
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
We propose that visceral states can influence beliefs through "visceral fit": People will judge states of the world associated with their current visceral experience as more likely. We found that warmth influenced belief in global warming (Studies 1-3) and that thirst impacted forecasts of drought and desertification (Study 5). These effects emerged in a naturalistic setting (Study 1) and in experimental lab settings (Studies 2, 3, and 5). Studies 2-6 distinguished between 3 mechanistic accounts: temperature as information (Studies 2 and 3), conceptual accessibility (Studies 4 and 5), and fluency of simulation (Studies 6a and 6b). Studies 2 and 3 ruled out the temperature as information account. Feeling warm enhanced belief in global warming even when temperature was manipulated in an uninformative indoor setting, when participants' attention was first directed to the indoor temperature, and when participants' belief about the current outdoor temperature was statistically controlled. Studies 4 and 5 ruled out conceptual accessibility as the key mediator: Priming the corresponding concepts did not produce analogous effects on judgment. Studies 6a and 6b used a causal chain design and found support for a "simulational fluency" account. Participants experiencing the visceral state of warmth constructed more fluent mental representations of hot (vs. cold) outdoor images, and those who were led to construe the same hot outdoor images more fluently believed more in global warming. Together, the results suggest that visceral states can influence one's beliefs by making matching states of the world easier to simulate and therefore seem more likely.
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Naturals and Strivers: Preferences and Beliefs about Sources of Achievement
Chia-Jung Tsay & Mahzarin Banaji
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
To understand how talent and achievement are perceived, three experiments compared assessments of "naturals" and "strivers." Professional musicians learned about two pianists, equal in achievement but who varied in the source of achievement: the "natural" with early evidence of high innate ability, versus the "striver" with early evidence of high motivation and perseverance (Experiment 1). Although musicians reported the strong belief that strivers will achieve over naturals, their preferences and beliefs showed the reverse pattern: they judged the natural performer to be more talented, more likely to succeed, and more hirable than the striver. In Experiment 2, this "naturalness bias" was observed again in experts but not in non-experts, and replicated in a between-subjects design in Experiment 3. Together, these experiments show a bias favoring naturals over strivers even when achievement is equal, and a dissociation between stated beliefs about achievement and actual choices in expert decision-makers.
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Hope Over Experience: Desirability and the Persistence of Optimism
Cade Massey, Joseph Simmons & David Armor
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many important decisions hinge on expectations of future outcomes. Decisions about health, investments, and relationships all depend on predictions of the future. These expectations are often optimistic: People frequently believe that their preferred outcomes are more likely than is merited. Yet it is unclear whether optimism persists with experience and, surprisingly, whether optimism is truly caused by desire. These are important questions because life's most consequential decisions often feature both strong preferences and the opportunity to learn. We investigated these questions by collecting football predictions from National Football League fans during each week of the 2008 season. Despite accuracy incentives and extensive feedback, predictions about preferred teams remained optimistically biased through the entire season. Optimism was as strong after 4 months as it was after 4 weeks. We exploited variation in preferences and matchups to show that desirability fueled this optimistic bias.
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Photographs cause false memories for the news
Deryn Strange, Maryanne Garry, Daniel Bernstein & Stephen Lindsay
Acta Psychologica, January 2011, Pages 90-94
Abstract:
What is the effect on memory when seemingly innocuous photos accompany false reports of the news? We asked people to read news headlines of world events, some of which were false. Half the headlines appeared with photographs that were tangentially related to the event; others were presented without photographs. People saw each headline only once, and indicated whether they remembered the event, knew about it, or neither. Photos led people to immediately and confidently remember false news events. Drawing on the Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), we suggest that people often relied on familiarity and other heuristic processes when making their judgments and thus experienced effects of the photos as evidence of memory for the headlines.
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People believe they have more free will than others
Emily Pronin & Matthew Kugler
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 28 December 2010, Pages 22469-22474
Abstract:
Four experiments identify a tendency for people to believe that their own lives are more guided by the tenets of free will than are the lives of their peers. These tenets involve the a priori unpredictability of personal action, the presence of multiple possible paths in a person's future, and the causal power of one's personal desires and intentions in guiding one's actions. In experiment 1, participants viewed their own pasts and futures as less predictable a priori than those of their peers. In experiments 2 and 3, participants thought there were more possible paths (whether good or bad) in their own futures than their peers' futures. In experiment 4, participants viewed their own future behavior, compared with that of their peers, as uniquely driven by intentions and desires (rather than personality, random features of the situation, or history). Implications for the classic actor-observer bias, for debates about free will, and for perceptions of personal responsibility are discussed.
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Risk and rationality: The effects of mood and decision rules on probability weighting
Helga Fehr-Duda, Thomas Epper, Adrian Bruhin & Renate Schubert
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Empirical research has shown that people tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities when valuing risky prospects, but little is known about factors influencing the shape of the probability weighting curve. Based on a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, we demonstrate that pre-existing good mood is significantly associated with women's probability weights: Women in a better than normal mood tend to weight probabilities relatively more optimistically. Many men, however, seem to be immunized against effects of incidental mood by applying a mechanical decision criterion such as maximization of expected value.
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Crystal Hoyt, Terry Price & Alyson Emrick
Leadership, November 2010, Pages 391-407
Abstract:
This research investigates the empirical assumptions behind the claim that leaders exaggerate the importance of their group's goals more so than non-leaders and that they may use these beliefs to justify deviating from generally accepted moral requirements when doing so is necessary for goal achievement. We tested these biased thought processes across three studies. The results from these three studies established the more-important-than-average effect, both for real and illusory groups. Participants claimed that their group goals are more important than the goals of others, and this effect was stronger for leaders than for non-leading group members. In Study 3, we demonstrated the justification bias and connected this bias to beliefs about the importance of group goals. Participants indicated that they would be more justified than others in engaging in unethical behaviors to attain their group's goals; leaders reported being more justified in such deviations than non-leaders; and the more highly leaders evaluated their group's goals, the greater justification bias they reported.
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Memory for intergroup apologies and its relationship with forgiveness
Catherine Philpot & Matthew Hornsey
European Journal of Social Psychology, February 2011, Pages 96-106
Abstract:
This paper examines memory for collective apologies. Our interest was in determining whether people are aware of intergroup apologies and whether this contributes to forgiveness for offending groups. Surveys conducted in three nations affected by Japanese World War II aggression found that participants were more likely to believe (incorrectly) that Japan had not apologized for WWII than to believe (correctly) that they had (Study 1). In contrast, participants were eight times more likely to believe that a corporation had apologized for misconduct than to (correctly) recall that they had not (Study 1). Forgiveness levels were higher among those who believed the group had apologized than among apology deniers, although the effect was weak and inconsistent. However, in a follow-up study that measured identification with the victim group it was found that high identifiers were significantly less likely to "remember" an apology (Study 2). Results suggest that memories for collective apologies are fluid and may not be causally related to intergroup forgiveness.
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Promoting De-Escalation of Commitment: A Regulatory-Focus Perspective on Sunk Costs
Daniel Molden & Chin Ming Hui
Psychological Science, January 2011, Pages 8-12
Abstract:
People frequently escalate their commitment to failing endeavors. Explanations for such behavior typically involve loss aversion, failure to recognize other alternatives, and concerns with justifying prior actions; all of these factors produce recommitment to previous decisions with the goal of erasing losses and vindicating these decisions. Solutions to escalation of commitment have therefore focused on external oversight and divided responsibility during decision making to attenuate loss aversion, blindness to alternatives, and justification biases. However, these solutions require substantial resources and have additional adverse effects. The present studies tested an alternative method for de-escalating commitment: activating broad motivations for growth and advancement (promotion). This approach should reduce concerns with loss and increase perceptions of alternatives, thereby attenuating justification motives. In two studies featuring hypothetical financial decisions, activating promotion motivations reduced recommitment to poorly performing investments as compared with both not activating any additional motivations and activating motivations for safety and security (prevention).
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A Self-Validation Perspective on the Mere Thought Effect
Joshua Clarkson, Zakary Tormala & Christopher Leone
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Self-generated thought has an important impact on attitude change, with repeated demonstrations of increased opportunity for thought about an attitude object increasing attitude extremity. The traditional explanation for this mere thought effect is that more time to think allows people to produce more attitude-consistent thoughts, which polarizes their attitudes. Expanding on this structural perspective, the current research explores a metacognitive account for the effect of time on attitude polarization. Three experiments demonstrate that thought confidence plays an independent mediating role in the mere thought effect (Experiment 1), that it accounts for reversals in the mere thought effect when people have too much time to think (Experiment 2), and that this reversal is tied to the difficulty people have retrieving thoughts when too much time is provided (Experiment 3). Thus, taking metacognitive features of thought into account sheds new light on self-persuasion in the mere thought paradigm.
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Dopamine D1 Receptors and Nonlinear Probability Weighting in Risky Choice
Hidehiko Takahashi et al.
Journal of Neuroscience, 8 December 2010, Pages 16567-16572
Abstract:
Misestimating risk could lead to disadvantaged choices such as initiation of drug use (or gambling) and transition to regular drug use (or gambling). Although the normative theory in decision-making under risks assumes that people typically take the probability-weighted expectation over possible utilities, experimental studies of choices among risks suggest that outcome probabilities are transformed nonlinearly into subjective decision weights by a nonlinear weighting function that overweights low probabilities and underweights high probabilities. Recent studies have revealed the neurocognitive mechanism of decision-making under risk. However, the role of modulatory neurotransmission in this process remains unclear. Using positron emission tomography, we directly investigated whether dopamine D1 and D2 receptors in the brain are associated with transformation of probabilities into decision weights in healthy volunteers. The binding of striatal D1 receptors is negatively correlated with the degree of nonlinearity of weighting function. Individuals with lower striatal D1 receptor density showed more pronounced overestimation of low probabilities and underestimation of high probabilities. This finding should contribute to a better understanding of the molecular mechanism of risky choice, and extreme or impaired decision-making observed in drug and gambling addiction.
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Cultivation effects of a newspaper on reality estimates and explicit and implicit attitudes
Florian Arendt
Journal of Media Psychology, Winter 2010, Pages 147-159
Abstract:
This paper explores the cultivation effect of a newspaper on its readers' reality estimates and attitudes. Additionally, the study tries to advance cultivation research by examining implicit attitudes (i.e., automatic affective reactions toward an object). A content analysis of four months of news coverage in one particular newspaper showed that foreigners were overrepresented as offenders and that the newspaper had a negative view of the EU. According to cultivation theory, it is assumed that the more people read a newspaper, the more their reality estimates and attitudes correspond to the most recurrent, stable, and overarching patterns of the newspaper's content. To test this hypothesis, a total of 453 students participated in a study that used a cross-lagged panel design with two waves and a time-lag of two months. Consistent with the cultivation hypothesis, those who spent more time reading the newspaper were more likely to overestimate the frequency of foreigners as offenders (i.e., first-order cultivation) and had more negative self-reported attitudes toward the EU (i.e., second-order cultivation). Additionally, those who read more of the newspaper showed more negative implicit attitudes toward the EU (i.e., implicit cultivation). The data show evidence of a significant causal influence of newspaper exposure on implicit attitudes, and a marginally significant causal effect on the overestimation of foreigners as offenders and on explicit attitudes toward the EU. The consideration of implicit attitudes as an additional dependent variable could advance cultivation theory and research.
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Forgetting We Forget: Overconfidence and Memory
Keith Marzilli Ericson
Journal of the European Economic Association, February 2011, Pages 43-60
Abstract:
Do individuals have unbiased beliefs, or are they over- or underconfident? Overconfident individuals may fail to prepare optimally for the future, and economists who infer preferences from behavior under the assumption of unbiased beliefs will make mistaken inferences. This paper documents overconfidence in a new domain, prospective memory, using an experimental design that is more robust to potential confounds than previous research. Subjects chose between smaller automatic payments and larger payments they had to remember to claim at a six-month delay. In a large sample of college and MBA students at two different universities, subjects make choices that imply a forecast of a 76% claim rate, but only 53% of subjects actually claimed the payment.
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Remembering makes evidence compelling: Retrieval from memory can give rise to the illusion of truth
Jason Ozubko & Jonathan Fugelsang
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, January 2011, Pages 270-276
Abstract:
The illusion of truth is traditionally described as the increase in perceived validity of statements when they are repeated (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). However, subsequent work has demonstrated that the effect can arise due to the increased familiarity or fluency afforded by repetition and not necessarily to repetition per se. We examine the case of information retrieved from memory. Recently experienced information is expected to be subsequently reexperienced as more fluent and familiar than novel information (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Therefore, the possibility exists that information retrieved from memory, because it is subjectively reexperienced at retrieval, would be more fluent or familiar than when it was first learned and would thus lead to an increase in perceived validity. Using a method to indirectly poll the perceived truth of factual statements, our experiment demonstrated that information retrieved from memory does indeed give rise to an illusion of truth. The effect was larger than when statements were explicitly repeated twice and was of comparable size to when statements were repeated 4 times. We conclude that memory retrieval is a powerful method for increasing the perceived validity of statements (and subsequent illusion of truth) and that the illusion of truth is a robust effect that can be observed even without directly polling the factual statements in question.
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Optimistic Behavior When a Decision Bias Is Costly: An Experimental Test
Astri Muren
Economic Inquiry, forthcoming
Abstract:
The existence of optimism when biased decisions are costly is investigated experimentally. Subjects make an informed guess about an exogenously determined event: the outside temperature a couple of days later. Payments in the control group depend only on how close the guess was to the realized temperature, while payments in the treatment group also depend positively on realized temperature. The data show the treatment group subjects to guess higher temperatures, that is, higher payments, compared with the control group. Results thus indicate that there is optimism also when a decision bias is costly.