Believing Context
Debunking Three Myths About Misinformation
Bertram Gawronski, Lea Nahon & Nyx Ng
Current Directions in Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent years have seen a surge in research on why people fall for misinformation and what can be done about it. Drawing on a framework that conceptualizes truth judgments of true and false information as a signal-detection problem, the current article identifies three inaccurate assumptions in the public and scientific discourse about misinformation: (1) People are bad at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias is not a driving force in judgments of misinformation, and (3) gullibility to false information is the main factor underlying inaccurate beliefs. Counter to these assumptions, we argue that (1) people are quite good at discerning true from false information, (2) partisan bias in responses to true and false information is pervasive and strong, and (3) skepticism against belief-incongruent true information is much more pronounced than gullibility to belief-congruent false information. These conclusions have significant implications for person-centered misinformation interventions to tackle inaccurate beliefs.
Do Fans Make Poor Referees? Exploring Citizens' Reactions to Partisan Gamesmanship
Ryan Claassen, Michael Ensley & John Barry Ryan
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political (as opposed to professional) election oversight is one area in which the U.S. scores extremely low in measures of election integrity. Meanwhile, rancorous political battles to determine acceptable election procedures and judge when tactics cross the line have become common events. Our work contributes to recent scholarship investigating whether voters prioritize democratic principles or strategically favor electoral procedures that provide partisan advantage. In two survey experiments, we confirm that Americans' attitudes about antidemocratic election tactics reveal more about which team they are cheering for than they do about whether the tactics are fraudulent. The tendency to engage in partisan motivated reasoning occurs among all partisans, but there are subtle differences as to when citizens will engage in it. Partisan motivated reasoning is more common when actions cause harm and by the partisans that are harmed. Finally, Independents are more impartial, but less likely to call out improper tactics in the aggregate because they often fail to condemn actions by either party.
Trump Ante Portas: Political Polarization Undermines Rule-Following Behavior
Christoph Feldhaus, Lukas Reinhardt & Matthias Sutter
University of Oxford Working Paper, November 2024
Abstract:
In a democracy, it is essential that citizens accept rules and laws, regardless of which party is in power. We study why citizens in polarized societies resist rules implemented by political opponents. This may be due to the rules' specific content, but also because of a general preference against being restricted by political opponents. We develop a method to measure the latter channel. In our experiment with almost 1,300 supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, we show that polarization undermines rule-following behavior significantly, independent of the rules' content. Subjects perceive the intentions behind (identical) rules as much more malevolent if they were imposed by a political opponent rather than a political ally.
The July 2024 Trump assassination attempt was followed by lower in-group support for partisan violence and increased group unity
Derek Holliday, Yphtach Lelkes & Sean Westwood
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 3 December 2024
Abstract:
The attempted assassination of Donald Trump led to widespread concern that the event would escalate political violence between U.S. partisans. While some politicians pleaded for Americans to unite against political violence and "turn down the temperature" on partisan hostility, others continued to engage in inflammatory rhetoric and blame. Using a national survey in the field at the time of the assassination attempt, we take the temperature of America's partisans before and after the event. We exploit the natural variation induced by the assassination attempt and large daily survey coverage (preattempt: 3,572; postattempt: 703; and 690 in a panel) in the days before and after the attempt to estimate the causal effects of extreme partisan violence on measures of partisan animosity and identity. Using panel and cross-sectional interrupted time series analysis, we find no evidence that the event increased tensions or support for retaliatory violence in the immediate aftermath. On the contrary, Republicans, including MAGA Republicans, became significantly less supportive of partisan violence against Democrats. Republicans also did not become more hostile toward Democrats; instead, their attachment to their own party significantly increased. Democrats experienced no change in attitudes. While nearly a third of Americans have no positive feelings toward the other party, and a supermajority have negative feelings, this animosity was not exacerbated by an extreme but salient instance of partisan violence. Despite the ills of modern political conflict, extreme partisan violence did not cause an immediate upsurge in support for violence.
Where to Hire? CEO-Governor Political Alignment and Internal Labor Allocation
Wanyi Wang & Linghang Zeng
Babson College Working Paper, November 2024
Abstract:
This paper studies how political alignment between a firm's CEO and a state's governor affects the firm's internal labor allocation. We find that firms are more likely to increase employment in states where the CEO is politically aligned with the governor. Our results remain robust when using close gubernatorial elections as plausibly exogenous variations in CEO-governor political alignment and when controlling for industry-governor alignment. The effect is stronger among firms with CEOs exhibiting stronger partisan leanings. Moreover, the effect is most pronounced in industries that are sensitive to policy changes, and politically aligned firms receive more government subsidies from the state. Our results remain similar after removing industries that are sensitive to local economic conditions. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that CEOs are more optimistic about state economic policies when politically aligned governors are in power, which leads to increased employment within those states.
Polarization in police union politics
Jennifer Gaudette
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although most local elections are officially nonpartisan, a debate exists regarding how much ideology matters in local politics. I test the effects of national polarization toward policing at the local level using a conjoint survey experiment and novel observational data. I find that police union endorsements send clear ideological signals about mayoral candidates to voters and voters respond accordingly: liberal (conservative) respondents are significantly less (more) likely to vote for police union-endorsed candidates. I create a new dataset of police union endorsements in every mayoral election in American cities with populations above 180,000 between 2011 and 2022. I find police union endorsements have significant negative effects on incumbent vote share in liberal cities at the same time as polarization occurs nationally. This evidence suggests that when national politics polarize on a local issue, ideology becomes an important component in local politics and that police union endorsements now inform about local candidate ideology.
Partisanship and Support for Devolving Concrete Policy Decisions to the States
David Doherty, Michael Touchton & Jeffrey Lyons
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do people think that some policies should be handled by the states, rather than the national government? In an era characterized by stark party polarization there is reason to suspect that attitudes regarding federalism are shaped by partisan considerations. Specifically, reported support for devolution may be driven by exposure to elite partisan cues and partisan reasoning tied to which political party devolution would empower. Using data from the 2022 Cooperative Election Study, we find that partisans tend to differ -- often substantially -- in their support for state-level decision-making regarding concrete policy proposals. However, these differences are largely driven by those who are most likely to be exposed to elite cues. We also find that, among both Democrats and Republicans, support for policy devolution is contingent on which party controls the state legislature in an individual's state. The findings suggest that partisanship plays a central role in shaping what the public says when asked about which level of government should determine whether to implement specific policy proposals.
The core of division: Examining how essentialist views of the U.S. underlie right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and nationalism
Jason Miller & Mark Landau
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
We propose that political polarization stems in part from differing conceptions of one's nation. Four studies tested the hypothesis that national essentialism -- conceiving one's nation as possessing an inherent, unchanging essence -- underlies three political ideologies: right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and nationalism. Study 1 (n = 263) provides correlational evidence that essentialist thinking about the U.S. positively predicted all three ideological variables, as well as support for conservative policies regarding religion, taxes, the environment, and immigration. Converging experiments show that prompting participants to think about the U.S.'s essence increased support for RWA and nationalism, but not SDO. Study 2 (n = 164) compared an essentialist to a non-essentialist framing of the U.S., while Study 3 (n = 150) compared essentialist framings of the U.S. to an unrelated concept (music). Parallel mediation analyses show that support for RWA and nationalism mediated the relationship between primed national essentialism and support for conservative policy positions. Study 4 (n = 174) directly replicated Study 2 and went further to test mediators, showing that perceptions of intergroup threat mediated the effect of national essentialism on RWA, while national identification mediated the effect of national essentialism on nationalism.