At the Water's Edge
Testing the Biden Hypotheses: Leader Tenure, Age, and International Conflict
Daehee Bak & Glenn Palmer
Foreign Policy Analysis, July 2010, Pages 257-273
Abstract:
Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. predicted that Barack Obama would face an international challenge in his early term by foreign enemies who want to test a young leader's resolve as a chief executive just like John F. Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. We test this argument using the directed-leader-dyad-period data for both world leaders and the US presidents between 1875 and 2001. We find that old leaders are more likely to be a target of militarized disputes, and even more so during the early term as opposed to Biden's prediction. The impact of tenure on the likelihood of being targeted largely depends on age. We also find that old Republican US presidents are especially vulnerable to foreign challenges early in their term.
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The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq
Luke Condra, Joseph Felter, Radha Iyengar & Jacob Shapiro
NBER Working Paper, July 2010
Abstract:
How are insurgents able to mobilize the population to fight and withhold valuable information from government forces? More specifically, what role does government mistreatment of non-combatants play? We study these questions by using uniquely-detailed micro-data from Afghanistan and Iraq to assess the impact of civilian casualties on insurgent violence. By comparing the data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we are able to distinguish short-run 'information' and 'capacity' effects from the longer run 'recruiting' and 'revenge' effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence for a revenge effect in that local exposure to ISAF generated civilian casualties drives increased insurgent violence over the long-run. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 6 additional violent incidents in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks. There is no evidence of short run effects in Afghanistan, thus ruling out the information and the capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting insurgents' mobilizing tools may be quite conflict-specific. Our results show that if counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan wish to minimize insurgent recruitment, they must minimize harm to civilians despite the greater risk this entails.
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Jennifer Kavanagh
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Poverty is often identified as a determinant of terrorist group participation, but existing research reveals mixed support for this relationship. Some studies find that macroeconomic decline is associated with increased production of terrorists, but micro-level research suggests terrorists have above average socioeconomic status and educational attainment. In this article, the author argues that poverty should increase terrorist group participation only for individuals with high education. The author suggests that as a result of terrorist group selection preferences and the lower opportunity costs for militant group membership in economically depressed environments, the likelihood of terrorist group participation should be highest for the highly educated, poor members of any population. The author tests the hypotheses using data from Krueger and Maleckova (2003) on participation in Hezbollah, adding an interaction term to their model. The results support the hypotheses. Poverty increases the likelihood of participation in Hezbollah only for those with at least high school education.
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Friends Don't Let Friends Proliferate
Scott Helfstein
Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2010, Pages 281-307
Abstract:
Scott Helfstein examines the efficacy of economic sanctions as a tool to counter nuclear proliferation. He argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, international cooperation is not a key determinant in sanction success. Instead, empirical evidence shows that sanctions have been effective at altering nuclear policies only when the sanction sender and target have had friendly relations.
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Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?
Jack Levy & William Thompson
International Security, Summer 2010, Pages 7-43
Abstract:
Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.
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Dangerous Patriots: Washington's Hidden Army during the American Revolution
Sean Halverson
Intelligence and National Security, April 2010, Pages 123-146
Abstract:
How did George Washington's intelligence networks during the American Revolution operate in a more open and proficient manner than their British counterparts? British and American forces developed competing understandings of intelligence gathering. Both used spies to obtain information. Washington, however, guided his intelligence officers to avoid monopolizing information and maintain their own tools of communication that did not require him to approve all the Rebels' covert operations or read through innumerable reports. Relying on his spies to develop their own roles of intelligencer far outside his direct command, Washington gave his spies more autonomy, while being able to overlap more sources. This allowed him to overcome the limitations of his forces. A close reading of the messages between Washington and his covert agents demonstrates that his intelligence system became an essential arm in molding the Americans partisan style asymmetrical strategy. This laid the groundwork for Washington to formulate intelligence gathering as an important tool in presidential power.
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Sarah Kreps
Foreign Policy Analysis, July 2010, Pages 191-215
Abstract:
Despite the increasing popularity of fighting wars through multilateral coalitions, scholars have largely been silent on the question of how public opinion in member states affects alliance cohesion. This article assesses public opinion data for states contributing to operations in Afghanistan. It finds that despite the unpopularity of the war, leaders have largely bucked public opinion and neither reduced nor withdrawn troops from NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Theoretical expectations about international cooperation and evidence from case studies point to elite consensus as the reason why leaders are not running for the exits in Afghanistan when their publics would prefer that they do. As the article shows, operating through a formal institution such as NATO creates systemic incentives for sustained international cooperation. The result is that elite consensus inoculates leaders from electoral punishment and gives states' commitments to Afghanistan a "stickiness" that defies negative public opinion. A formal alliance such as NATO may therefore create more policy constraints than an ad hoc coalition but also increase the costs of defection and confer a degree of staying power that is unexpected given the adverse public opinion environment.
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Does Terrorism Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data
Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner & Lars Siemers
Journal of Law and Economics, February 2010, Pages 65-93
Abstract:
Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1982-2002, we employ two indexes that cover a wide range of human rights to empirically analyze whether and to what extent terrorism affects human rights. According to our results, terrorism significantly, but not dramatically, diminishes governments' respect for basic human rights such as the absence of extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. The result is robust to how we measure terrorist attacks, to the method of estimation, and to the choice of countries in our sample. However, we find no effect of terrorism on empowerment rights.
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The missing currency of Israeli/Palestinian negotiations
Lloyd Cohen
Israel Affairs, July 2010, Pages 455-465
Abstract:
The premise of the Arab-Israeli 'land for peace' process is that each side values what it will receive more than what it must surrender. The repeated failure of this process spanning decades reveals the shocking truth that this premise is erroneous. For the process to succeed, the currency that the Arabs must bring to the table is the ability and willingness to pay for their sovereignty in the currency of vigorous enforcement of Israeli rights and privileges, something they are not willing to do. Why not? At present, the payoff to the Palestinian Arabs as a body of a state is simply not worth the price they must pay.
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Risk Groups in Exposure to Terror: The Case of Israel's Citizens
Yariv Feniger & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar
Social Forces, March 2010, Pages 1451-1462
Abstract:
This research addresses a largely ignored question in the study of terror: who are its likely victims? An answer was sought through analysis of comprehensive data on civilian victims of terror in Israel from 1993 through 2003. The chances of being killed in seemingly random terror attacks were found unequally distributed in Israeli society, but the weaker sectors were not the most vulnerable. This pattern may be attributed to the perpetration of most terror attacks in public places, where members of underprivileged groups are less likely to be. Paradoxically, ethnic segregation, gender and other forms of social exclusion and inequality may have helped to protect marginalized social groups from the risk of terror victimization.
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Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to "Bribe the Soviets Out" and Move NATO In
Mary Elise Sarotte
International Security, Summer 2010, Pages 110-137
Abstract:
Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided "to bribe the Soviets out," as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward. The goal was to establish NATO as the main post-Cold War security institution before alternative structures could arise and potentially diminish U.S. influence. Admirers of a muscular U.S. foreign policy and of NATO will view this strategy as sound; critics will note that it alienated Russia and made NATO's later expansion possible. Either way, this finding challenges the scholarly view that the United States sought to integrate its former superpower enemy into postconflict structures after the end of the Cold War.
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The effect of essentialism in settings of historic intergroup atrocities
Hanna Zagefka, Samuel Pehrson, Richard Mole & Eva Chan
European Journal of Social Psychology, August 2010, Pages 718-732
Abstract:
Three studies tested the effects of essentialist beliefs regarding the national ingroup in situations where a perpetrator group has inflicted harm on a victim group. For members of the perpetrator group, it was hypothesised that essentialism has a direct positive association with collective guilt felt as a result of misdeeds conducted by other ingroup members in the past. Simultaneously, it was hypothesised to have an indirect negative association with collective guilt, mediated by perceived threat to the ingroup. Considering these indirect and direct effects jointly, it was hypothesised that the negative indirect effect suppresses the direct positive effect, and that the latter would only emerge if perceived ingroup threat was controlled for. This was tested in a survey conducted in Latvia among Russians (N = 70) and their feelings toward how Russians had treated ethnic Latvians during the Soviet occupation; and in a survey in Germany among Germans (N = 84), focussing on their feelings toward the Holocaust. For members of the victim group, it was hypothesised that essentialism would be associated with more anger and reluctance to forgive past events inflicted on other ingroup members. It was proposed that this effect would be mediated by feeling connected to the ingroup victims. This was tested in a survey conducted among Hong Kong Chinese and their feelings toward the Japanese and the Nanjing massacre (N = 56). Results from all three studies supported the hypotheses.
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Susan Hyde
Perspectives on Politics, June 2010, Pages 511-527
Abstract:
Randomized field experiments have gained attention within the social sciences and the field of democracy promotion as an influential tool for causal inference and a potentially powerful method of impact evaluation. With an eye toward facilitating field experimentation in democracy promotion, I present the first field-experimental study of international election monitoring, which should be of interest to both practitioners and academics. I discuss field experiments as a promising method for evaluating the effects of democracy assistance programs. Applied to the 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia, the random assignment of international election observers reveals that even though the election was widely regarded as democratic, the presence of observers had a measurable effect on votes cast for the incumbent candidate, indicating that such democracy assistance can influence election quality even in the absence of blatant election-day fraud.
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Terrorist Threats and Police Performance: A Study of Israeli Communities
David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, Tal Jonathan & Gali Aviv
British Journal of Criminology, July 2010, Pages 725-747
Abstract:
In recent years, scholars and police practitioners have become increasingly concerned with the possible impacts of terrorism on police performance. Some scholars have argued that increased terrorist threats will reduce resources that are devoted to ordinary policing functions such as solving crimes, and that anti-terrorism functions may overshadow traditional police activities. Others have suggested that heightened surveillance due to terrorist threats could have unintended crime prevention benefits. In this study, we examine the impacts of terrorist threats on one aspect of police performance-the clearance of police files. Using Israel during the Second Intifada (2000-04) as a case study, we analyse the impact of level of terrorist threat, while controlling for other possible confounding factors, separating out communities that are primarily Jewish or Arab. Our analyses suggest that terrorist threats have a significant impact upon police performance, though that impact varies strongly by type of community. Higher levels of threat are associated with lower proportions of cleared cases in the majority Jewish communities, and higher proportions in the majority Arab communities.